Transitions from military rule in South America: the obligational legitimacy hypothesis/ by Mitchell, Michael Joseph.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1988
Transitions from military rule in South America: the
obligational legitimacy hypothesis/
Mitchell, Michael Joseph.











RULE IN SOUTH AMERICA:
OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS
by











CURI LASS FICATION OF iS -AG!
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. 1E?QR' SECURITV CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
'b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
>. SECURITY CwASSlFCATiON AUTHORITY
} DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
:. ADDRESS \City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b. ADDRESS (City. State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









riTLE (Include Security Classification)
TRANSITIONS FROM MILITARY RULE IN SOUTH AMERICA














COSATi CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
= ELD GROUP sub-group South America; Latin America; Military;
Political Transition; Democratization
ABSTRACT {Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
In recent years South America has witnessed a wave of transitions from military
rule. These military regimes were different from past interventions in that the
military came to power with their own agenda, not to specifically support an interest
group, and they came to stay.
This thesis examines the transition phenomenon from the military perspective,
and hypothesize that these militaries chose to transition from power because of a
breakdown in "obi igational legitimacy" (a common identity within the military that
justifies their right to rule). Specifically, a causal model in which obi igational
legitimacy is the dependent variable and nine causal conditions (both internal and
external to the military organization) are the independent variables, is constructed
and tested. This study considers the recent transitions in Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, and Uruguay, and the non transition in Chile.
!0 DlSTR!BUTlON /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
C3 UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED D SAME AS RPT
2a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
Prof. Thomas Bruneau
DTIC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED




)D FORM 1473, 34 mar 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
1
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
t> U.S Government Printing Office: 1986—6
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whin Dmtm Enfrmd)
It is concluded that a breakdown in obligational legitimacy is the key
factor leading to the military's decision to leave power. This perspective
offers new insights for analysis of transitions, future transitions, and
United States foreign policy options regarding military regimes, regimes
in transition, and the new democracies of South America.
S N 0)02- LF- 014- 6601 UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGEOHim Dmtm Enfrmd'
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Transitions From Military Rule In South America:
The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis
by
Michael J. Mitchell
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1978
M.S.S.M., University of Southern California, 1982
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






In recent years South America has witnessed a wave of
transitions from military rule. These military regimes
were different from past interventions in that the military
came to power with their own agenda, not to specifically
support an interest group, and they came to stay.
This thesis examines the transition phenomenon from the
military perspective, and hypothesize that these militaries
chose to transition from power because of a breakdown in
"obligational legitimacy" (a common identity within the
military that justifies their right to rule) . Specifical-
ly, a causal model in which obligational legitimacy is the
dependent variable and nine causal conditions (both
internal and external to the military organization) are the
independent variables, is constructed and tested. This
study considers the recent transitions in Argentina,
Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, and the non transition in Chile.
It is concluded that a breakdown in obligational
legitimacy is the key factor leading to the military's
decision to leave power. This perspective offers new
insights for analysis of transitions, future transitions,
and United States foreign policy options regarding military
regimes, regimes in transition, and the new democracies of
South America.
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The objective of this thesis is to investigate the
phenomenon of the recent transitions of the military from
government in South America. This study will attempt to
build a causal model explaining the transition process.
The specific hypothesis of this model is, military regimes
in South America choose to transition from power because of
a breakdown in the military organization's common agreement
of their justification to rule. There are five important
underlying elements of this hypothesis. First, this
investigation will only consider the "ruler-type" military
regimes in South America. Although Chapter 1 will deal
more specifically with this regime type, a ruler regime is
characterized by a military that has visibly and/or
publicly proclaimed itself to be in control of the
government. The military ruling hierarchy is at the apex
of control and the military institution participates
substantially in the administration of the government.
Secondly, this study will highlight many of the
reasons military ruler regimes have, to stay in power.
These reasons vary from non moral considerations like
institutional survival, tradition, underemployment and
self-interests, to moral considerations such as sacred
duty, commitment, and patriotism. Chapter 3 will deal
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with this element and attempt to show that the forces
influencing the military to remain in power do not
originate and are not controlled by single actors or
groups in society.
The third element of this hypothesis, that military
regimes choose to leave power, can best be understood by
the conclusion that causal forces external to the military
cannot fully explain transition initiation. The military
is not a pawn being pushed and pulled in and out of power
by exogenous forces. This study will attempt to show that
the key to military transition from power has its origins
within the military itself. The military holds a monopoly
on coercive power in society and needs only the will to use
it to maintain its rule.
Chapter 4 deals with the fourth element of this
hypothesis, "obligational legitimacy" (that entity from
which the military derives its will to intervene and
maintain power) . When obligational legitimacy breaks
down, the military then chooses to leave power. Obliga-
tional legitimacy is defined as the support, acquiescence,
and consent for actions (up to and including coercion)
,
motivated by subjective agreement that the military regime
has a duty and obligation to rule, by those belonging to
the military organization. This alleged internal
justification is unique to ruler regimes and sets the
12
trajectory for their perceptions and actions while in
power.
The fifth element of this hypothesis is that obliga-
tional legitimacy is influenced by conditions external and
internal to the military organization. Chapter 5 offers
nine causal variables that influence obligational legiti-
macy. This chapter completes the construction of a causal
model in which obligational legitimacy is the dependent
variable and the nine causal conditions are the independent
variables. These variables will each be dealt with
individually and include international influence, economic
forces, external legitimacy, political capital, political
culture, organizational culture, fractionalization
,
mission orientation, and mission success. Through a
strict use of logic, outlined in Chapter 2, these variables
will be categorized as necessary, sufficient, or contribu-
ting for obligational legitimacy breakdown and thus
transition initiation.
Most studies of the recent transitions in South
America center on the outcome of democratization. Those
that do deal with the transition only look at the military
from the outside. This study will discuss the transition
process from the military perspective. Specifically, it
will look at the underlying metaphysical assumptions (of
which obligational legitimacy is a key component) of the
military common identity. By looking at the transition
13
process from the point of view of obligational legitimacy-
breakdown, and building a causal model with deductive
logic, we can then, in Chapter 6, inductively test case
studies of transitions from the unique perspective of the
military who allegedly initiates it. From the Obliga-
tional Legitimacy Hypothesis and its application to
specific case studies, this thesis hopes to highlight the
existence and key role played by obligational legitimacy,
offer a new perspective to analyze transitions and their
outcomes, and formulate more effective foreign policy
options in dealing with military governments, military
regimes in transition and the redemocratization of South
America.
A. LEVELS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT
Since independence, Latin American history has been
replete with successive waves of military intervention in
national politics. The degree of intervention has varied
on four broad levels. The lowest level of intervention is
political influence through such avenues as bureaucratic
pressure and interest group lobbying, similar to the
efforts of the United States military. A more aggressive
and direct form of military intervention is typified by the
military as a political block actor, functioning in similar
fashion to a political party, or in some cases, as a branch
of the government and exercising partial de jure power
14
(e.g. Brazil's dentro dos limites da lei constitutional
clause 1 ) , or case by case de facto veto power over the
civilian government. An example of this level of interven-
tion is highlighted by the present situation in Guatemala.
The military as a shadow government is an even more direct
form of intervention. This level of intervention is an
expansion of the political block actor level in that the
civilian government exercises formal de jure power, but the
military exercises de facto power. In other words, the
civilian government is the figure head and all the
important decisions are made by the military. An example
of this level of intervention is Panama today. Quite
often, though, military intervention in Latin America takes
the extreme form of the military-as-government, and it is
this level that this thesis centers on. At this level,
the military has visibly and publicly proclaimed itself
the leader of government, the government is controlled by
the military Commander-in-Chief or a military junta made up
of the separate service commanders, and there is sub-
stantial military institutional participation in govern-
ment administration. This definition is sufficiently broad
to include the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of
1 The 1946 Constitution provides for the military to
be obedient to the executive, but "within the limits of the
law," which leaves a wide option for the organization that
is constitutionally charged with maintaining law and order.
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics . (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 76-77.
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Argentina (1976-1983) , Brazil (1964-1985) and Uruguay
(1973— 1985); the personalistic dictatorships of Pinochet's
Chile (1973-present) and Ongania s Argentina (1966-1970);
and the "radical" regime of Peru (1968-1980).
B. MILITARY-AS-GOVERNMENT REGIME TYPES
At the military-as-government level of political
intervention, two general regime types are prevalent:
"arbitrator" and "ruler" regimes. Historically, the
praetorian tendencies of Latin American militaries took
form as "arbitrator-type" regimes. Typically, following a
military coup, order was established, political disputes
were settled, a new and "acceptable" regime was installed,
and the military returned to the barracks. Transition from
military rule was, by definition, understood and expected
with arbitrator-type regimes. As Jorge Dominguez explains,
this regime type "has no independent political organization
or ideology; it is often content merely to supervise the
leading civilian officials, . . . finds nothing wrong with
the social and economic status quo, and prefers a civilian
government." 2 Welch and Smith offer two regime subtypes,
2 Jorge Dominguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba,"
Armies and Politics in Latin America , ed. Abraham F.
Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, (New York: Holmes and
Meier, 1986), p. 262.
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"predatory regimes 11 and "reformist regimes, 3 " that further
clarify the arbitrator category. Predatory regimes were
characterized by their relatively small role in society,
but with a large share of society's resources and capital
at their disposal. They were also typically aligned with
the elite oligarchy. This regime subtype was prominent
between independence and the 1920s. Reformist military
regimes evolved in the 1920s with the rise of political
reform throughout Latin America and were prominent through
the 1950s. In this reform era, the middle class became a
major political actor and the military became more
professionalized and separated from society, but still
maintained its arbitrator role.
By the 1960s, however, "ruler-type" military regimes
evolved which had no expectation of returning to the
barracks after assuming power. Jorge Dominguez charac-
terizes this regime type as having little confidence in
civilian rule, rejecting the existing social order, and
expecting to stay in power, to construct a new ideology and
possibly create its own political organization to prolong
its rule. 4 Welch and Smith highlight two such ruler regime
subtypes: radical military regimes and guardian military
3 Claude Emerson Welch and Arther K. Smith, Military
Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations ,
(North Scituate, Mass: Duxbury Press, 1974), pp. 54-67.
4 Dominguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba," p. 263.
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regimes. 5 Radical regimes were prominent in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. They manifested the growing level of
political consciousness within the military and required a
high level of politicization with direct links to the
masses. Republican dictatorships and populist regimes are
examples of the radical ruler-type regime. 6 The guardian
regime further politicizes the role of the military in
society and typifies the most recent ruler-type military
regimes in Latin America. These regimes see themselves as
"the unique custodians of the national interest. . . . and
consider themselves to be the repositories of national
honor and prestige." 7 This study will focus on the
guardian ruler-type regime, and will also consider the
radical regime subtype in the case of Peru.
C. WEAKNESSES WITH CURRENT RULER REGIME STUDIES
Despite the all-encompassing political orientation of
ruler-type military regimes (and a monopoly on the coercive
force to achieve their goals) , Latin America has, in the
past few years, witnessed a wave of transitions 8 from
5 Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule:
Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations , pp. 65-73.
6 The Rodriguez Lara period (1972-1976) in Ecuador is
an example of this regime type.
7 Ibid. ,p. 67.
8
"Transition" in this study refers to the "interval
between one political regime and another. . . . Transitions
are delimited, on one side, by the launching of the process
18
military rule that defies a fundamental objective of these
regimes: the goal to stay in power; a goal overlooked,
quickly forgotten, or discarded by most transition studies.
The outcomes of these transitions are moves toward
democratization and most studies have centered on this
phenomenon. Although most of these studies are relevant,
helpful and insightful in explaining specific pieces of the
transition/liberalization puzzle, key issues are circum-
vented or completely neglected. At the deepest level of
analysis, these studies only consider the military from the
outside looking in and not from the inside looking out. In
other words, consideration of the military perspective is
rarely entertained, or is shallow at best. 9 This may be
because of the interest in the positive future prospects of
of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the
other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the
return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence
of a revolutionary alternative." Guillermo O'Donnell and
Philippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies
,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 6.
"Transition," in this study, is a subset of the larger
phenomenon of military withdrawal from government and is,
therefore, assumed mutually exclusive from social upheaval
and violent revolution.
9 Studies in this category include: Enrique A.
Baloyra, ed.
,
Comparing New Democracies, Transition and
Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern
Cone . (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987) ; David Pion-Berlin,
"The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983,"
Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs . (May
1987): 55-76; Gordan Richards, "Stabilization Crisis and
the Breakdown of Military Authoritarianism in Latin
America," Comparative Political Studies . (January 1986):
449-485.
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liberalization, or because of the more readily available
research opportunities available in the newly opened
society (political parties, people to interview, etc.)* In
short, liberalization is methodologically privileged
because it is easier to empirically identify and inves-
tigate. Only a handful of studies attempt to consider the
military point of view, yet they too fall short of a
complete analysis of the military mind. 10 A second
category of studies that attempts to explain the transition
phenomena choose not to (due to limits in the scope of the
paper, etc.), or simply neglect to, investigate important
interrelated avenues of potential explanation. For
instance, a study may discuss how a transition occurred,
but not why it occurred. 11 Arturo Valenzuela highlights
four further problems of the relevant current research
10 Works in this category include: Jack Child,
Geopolitics and Conflict in South America . (California:
Hoover Institution Press, 1985); S.E. Finer, The Man on
Horseback— The Role of the Military in Politics , (New
York: Praeger, 1962) (which was published prior to the
advent of ruler type military regimes) ; Alain Rouquie,
"Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-
Dominated Polities in Latin America," Armies and Politics
in Latin America , ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel
Fitch, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), pp. 444-477;
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics, Changing Patterns
in Brazil , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1971)
.
11 A study in this category is: O'Donnell and
Schmitter, Transitions From Military Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.
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format. 12 He says it is a distortion of reality to
conceive of the civilian side of the transition equation in
the same light as the military side. 13 Certainly the
military is a unique and difficult to compare institution.
Also, civil society is not a monolithic institution, but a
complex conglomeration of many institutions. Secondly, he
states it is equally misleading to consider the military as
a mechanical, neutral force, a symptom of another problem,
in which a vacuum is created and the military simply steps
in to fill it. 14 Third, Valenzuela highlights the
misconception of idealizing the military as a professional
neutral force that is required to move into politics due to
the irresponsibility of civilians. 15 Finally, he points
12 Arturo Valenzuela, "A Note on the Military and
Social Science Theory," Third World Quarterly . January
1985, pp. 138-141.
13 Studies in this category include: Douglas A.
Chalmers and Craig H. Robinson, "Why Power Contenders
Choose Liberalization: Perspectives from South America,"
Armies and Politics in Latin America , ed. Abraham F.
Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1986), pp. 389-414; Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and
Double Standards," Commentary
,
(November 1979): pp. 35-45.
14 A study in this category is: Alexandre de S.C.
Barros and Edmundo C. Coelho, "Military Intervention and
Withdrawal in South America," Armies and Politics in Latin
America , ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, (New
York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), pp. 437-443.
15 Studies in this category include: Morris Janowitz,
Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing World
,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977); Sam C.
Sarkesian, "A Political Perspective on Military Power in
Developing Areas," The Military and Security in the Third
World: Domestic and International Impacts , ed. Sheldon W.
Simon, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 3-46.
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out the incorrect assumption of certain studies that the
transition process is located within the confines of
national society, thus down playing the impact of interna-
tional influences. 16 Each of these six categories of
theoretical shortcomings also miss two additional salient
points: if it were not for the initiation of the transition
in the first place, democratization could not take place
with the depth or breadth it has. Secondly the military is
not a neutral pawn in the initiation of transitions, but
rather its immediate author. If we are to fathom transi-
tions from military rule, we must first know something of
the military mind at all levels of understanding, from its
values and norms, to resultant actions. This means we
cannot stop our investigation at the military's general
view of reality (presented in theories of National Security
Doctrine and Geopolitics) , but look at the underlying
metaphysical assumptions that support this view. It may
well be at this less studied baseline of metaphysical
assumptions that the transition process is most clearly
manifested. This metaphysical level is not easily
observable or obvious, but is real. Even if Latin American
militaries never discussed metaphysics (though there is
some evidence demonstrating they do) , a certain philosophy
governs all actions, whether the actor consciously
16 An example in this category is: Karen L. Remmer,
"Exclusionary Democracy," Studies in Comparative
International Development , Winter 1985-86, pp. 64-85.
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perceives it or not. What is obvious and history supports,
the time in power of all military regimes is finite. The
pivotal question that follows is, why does the military
leave power when it does?
D. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY HYPOTHESIS
By constructing and testing the following framework, I
will show that militaries choose to relinquish power
because of their loss of obligational legitimacy. 17 It is
specifically argued that nine independent, or explanatory,
variables (international influence, economic forces,
external legitimacy, political capital, political culture,
organizational culture, fractionalization, mission
orientation, and mission success) play necessary, suffi-
cient, or contributing roles in influencing obligational
legitimacy and ultimately, transition from military rule.
Through this causal structure, the Obligational Legitimacy
Hypothesis offers new prisms for understanding the military
transition phenomena. This model's ultimate aim is best
explained in general terms by Charles A. Beard,
17 Defined as: Support, acquiescence, and consent for
actions (up to and including coercion) , motivated by
subjective agreement that the military regime has the duty
and obligation to rule, by those belonging to the military
organization. Obligational legitimacy is not a process,
but a common identity that forms the foundation of a
military regime's internal justification for actions or
beliefs, specifically in terms of maintaining power. For a
detailed discussion of obligational legitimacy see Chapter
4.
23
No one can deny that the idea is fascinating— the idea
of subduing the phenomena of politics to the laws of
causation, of penetrating to the mystery of its transfor-
mations, of symbolizing the trajectory of its future; in
a word, of grasping destiny by the forelock and bringing
it prostrate to earth. The very idea is itself worthy of
the immortal gods.... If nothing ever comes of it, its
very existence will fertilize thought and enrich
imagination. 18
Specifically, the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis
offers a new way of looking at military transitions from
power (as a heuristic devise designed to explain, fertilize
thought, enrich imagination, and establish a perspective
for further evaluation) , and attempts to draw on all
available evidence and remain objective. The Obligational
Legitimacy Hypothesis may relegate certain variables to
less than pivotal importance by holding to a strict logic
format, which may run counter to common assumptions or
personal viewpoints. As this model does, the reader must
also adhere to Gaetano Salvemini's admonition that
"Impartiality is a dream and honesty a duty. We cannot be
impartial, but we can be intellectually honest." 19
18 Charles A. Beard cited in David Easton, The
Political System
. 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1971) , introductory quotation.
19 Jacques Barzan and Henry F. Graff, The Modern
Researcher





The object of our analysis, the ruler-type military
regime has been categorized and defined. The current
literature, discussing ruler regimes and their transition
from power, has also been investigated and found lacking in
various aspects. The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis
was presented as a new alternative in this field of study.
In order to efficiently and effectively present and inves-
tigate the hypothesis, this thesis will employ a logic
structure and methodology designed to circumvent the
problems found with other studies on this subject.
A. LOGIC CONSTRUCTION20
To avoid confusion or misinterpretation of the
Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis, further explanation of
its structure and foundation logic will be presented.
First, the variables of this study are divided into
dependent and independent variables. The key variable this
hypothesis attempts to explain, obligational legitimacy, is
the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are
termed independent variables and are the hypothesized cause
20 Logical argument structure derived generally from




of the dependent variable. In other words, the dependent
variable is the expected outcome of the independent
variables. Independent variables in one study, it should
be noted, may be the dependent variables of another study,
depending on the research objective.
The diagram in Figure 1 outlines the research objective
of this study. The lines represent inferences and the
numbers represent premises. Numbers 3-11 are the nine
independent variables. They are the causal assertions of
the key assertion, "2", which is the dependent variable,
"obligational legitimacy." Separate lines connect the
causal assertions to the key assertion not because they are
not in some way interrelated; on the contrary, application
of this model to real world examples highlights the high
degree of interrelationship and synergism. These separate
lines also do not necessarily represent sufficient
conditions with respect to "2," but simply imply that each
independent variable is said to support "2," which in turn
supports the key conclusion "1." Therefore, we need to
look at each claim separately to validate the individual
inferences. This will also help to avoid errors in logic
relating to necessary and sufficient conditions which will
be discussed in the next section. In investigating these
individual inferences, it may turn out that "4," for
example, has a weak causal connection, but it should not be






















Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis Causal Model
Figure 1
27
evidence is not yet in. The numbers "12" and "13" are
further assertions representing types of transition. For
simplicity, this study only depicts liberalization "13"
(which could come in substantive forms through expansion of
institutional, societal and economic equality, or solely on
the procedural level through increased participation and/or
increased public contestation) and totalitarian outcomes
"12" (which could come in fascist, socialist, and populist
dictatorship forms to name a few possibilities) . These
further assertions are the center of most research today
and may be more important in the final analysis, but "1" is
the key conclusion without which "12" and "13" will not
occur.
B. LOGICAL CAUSATION
With this simple construction of the variables and
assertions, causal implications of the independent
variables can now be considered. Using the diagram in
Figure 1, to say that "3" is a sufficient condition for
"2" is to say that the fact of "3" suffices to guarantee
the outcome "2." In other words, if "3" is present, than
"2" is present (if 3 then 2) . A necessary condition, on
the other hand, is a condition which "3" must obtain (is
necessary) in order that "2" obtain. Therefore, if "2" is
present, we know that "3" must be present. A necessary
condition does not guarantee an outcome (i.e. not suffi-
28
cient) , and is not a required precondition for sufficiency.
On the other hand, with a sufficient condition, all
necessary conditions will also be present by transition
initiation because, by definition, the necessary conditions
are required to complete the causal chain. They may come
before the sufficient condition, simultaneously, or
possibly as a result of the sufficient condition. It is
possible to have a condition that is both sufficient and
necessary and is termed an equivalent condition. Also, if
all necessary conditions are met simultaneously, a
sufficient and therefore equivalent, condition exists.
Finally, contributing variables are those independent
variables that are neither sufficient nor necessary. They
may be very important intervening conditions, but do not,
in a strictly logical sense, meet the special requirements
defined above. Figure 2 outlines potential examples of
necessary, sufficient and equivalent conditions leading to
obligational legitimacy breakdown and transition. It is
important to note that these models are for clarification
only; the research agenda will follow the model in Figure
1. Each individual transition may not reflect the causal
models offered in Figure 2 (i.e. one transition may occur
from an equivalent condition, while another from a
sufficient condition, etc.). For clarification, assume a
necessary condition for a breakdown in obligational



































































































will expand upon later) . This condition does not guarantee
obligational legitimacy breakdown, but it is required (i.e.
necessary, but not sufficient) . Further assume that
fractionalization is a sufficient condition for obligation-
al legitimacy breakdown. This condition is not required
for obligational legitimacy breakdown, but if it is
present, breakdown will occur. Furthermore, if frac-
tionalization is a sufficient condition for obligational
legitimacy breakdown, that means fractionalization
guarantees the truth of obligational legitimacy breakdown
(i.e. makes the truth of fractionalization necessary)
.
Therefore, fractionalization can't be true unless obliga-
tional legitimacy breakdown actually happens, meaning that
obligational legitimacy breakdown is a necessary condition
for fractionalization. So, whenever an independent
variable is a sufficient condition for the dependent
variable (e.g. obligational legitimacy breakdown) , the
dependent variable is a necessary condition for that
independent variable. This test also applies to necessary
independent variables which claim a sufficient condition
from the dependent variable. These concepts are complimen-
tary converse relationships and are useful to further
confirm the necessity and/or sufficiency of independent
variables. Although not intuitively obvious, this is one
important reason why this model makes such an effort to
keep each inference separate in its relationship to the
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dependent variable. Prejudging variables to be sufficient
or necessary could lead to spurious conclusions.
Besides the utility of the concepts "necessary" and
"sufficient" in terms of causation, they also have
important "control" implications. Max Black suggests that
control of an unwanted effect consists of knowledge of a
necessary condition of that effect. He also suggests that
control of a wanted effect consists of knowledge of a
sufficient condition of that effect. 21 Control in this
sense means we can do something about the dependent
variable. In the specific context of obligational
legitimacy, the implication for the future of democratiza-
tion in Latin America is certainly crucial. The implica-
tion is, we could more astutely support the efficacious and
efficient circumstances in countries still under military
rule so that a sufficient condition for obligational
legitimacy breakdown is created and thus, military
transition from power. For example, assuming this study
finds fractionalization as a sufficient condition for
obligational legitimacy breakdown and highlights how
fractional ization occurs, new influences might be brought
to bear on military regimes. If we identify necessary
conditions for obligational legitimacy reconstitution,
first through an understanding of its breakdown, we can
21 Max Black, Critical Thinking , (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 325.
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help prevent the potential danger of future military rule




An obvious keystone of any causal model is the
identification and categorization of the independent
variables as sufficient, necessary, or contributing
conditions. These variables, in the initial analysis,
will be categorized using deductive inference (i.e.
reasoning from the general to the specific) . By continuing
to keep the independent variables separate and directly
connected to the dependent variable for the case study
analysis, we can use John Stuart Mill's inductive "Method
of Agreement, Method of Difference, and Joint Method of
Agreement and Difference" to discern sufficiency and
necessity. 22 To use these methods, we must assume that the
actual necessary and sufficient conditions are present in
our list of independent variables. Of course we cannot be
sure all the possible variables are present, nor can we
decisively conclude that these variables are absolutely
necessary. We can only be as sure as the evidence
suggests. But this is the nature of inductive research.
22 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic , 8th ed. (New
York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1906), pp. 253-285.
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In applying the Method of Agreement to this model,
assume that one or more of the independent variables is
suspected of being necessary for obligational legitimacy
breakdown and thus military transition from power. By
inductive judgment we note that one or more of these
independent variables is always present when obligational
legitimacy breakdown is present. Conversely, these
independent variables are not found missing when obliga-
tional legitimacy breakdown is present. We can then be
relatively confident that they are necessary variables.
To find a sufficient condition we must apply the
Method of Differences. Assume we are able to collect all
the relevant conditions that lead to obligational legiti-
macy breakdown (realizing there could be, of course, a
multitude of irrelevant conditions, or contributing
conditions in the list also) . It is important to note that
every sufficient condition need not (and probably will not)
be present in each case of obligational legitimacy break-
down, as is required of necessary conditions. Potentially
sufficient independent variables are eliminated if they are
present, or could be present, and obligational legitimacy
breakdown is not.
By combining the "Method of Agreement" and the "Method
of Differences," termed the "Joint Method of Agreement and
Differences," we can find conditions that are both
necessary and sufficient. First we apply the Method of
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Differences to find any sufficient conditions. We than
apply the Method of Agreement to these sufficient condi-
tions to see if they are also necessary. This joint method
is also useful in confirming the equivalent condition of
the complex variable of all necessary conditions, which by
definition is also a sufficient condition. After applying
these inductive methods to this theory's independent
variables, we can test the conclusions deductively with
specific case studies, hopefully adding new insights to the
military transition from power phenomena.
Just as John Stuart Mill's rigorous analysis methods
are applied to the independent variables of the Obligation-
al Legitimacy Hypothesis, the dependent variable will
undergo the scrutiny of Aristotle's four ways of under-
standing an entity. 23 First, this study will look at the
origins of (material cause) obligational legitimacy.
Second, the "why" (formal cause) will be considered. The
third and fourth categories of understanding encompassed in
this hypothesis are those most studies now center on, the
questions of "how" (the efficient cause) , and "what" (the
final cause) . In short, this model will seek to answer
the questions "out of what," "why," "how," and "what,"
23 Summarized in William T. Bluhm, Theories of the
Political System
.




thereby knowing as fully as possible the event of military
transitions from power in South America. 24
D. MANIFESTATIONS OF APPLICATION OF LOGIC AND
METHODOLOGY IN CURRENT STUDIES
Before discussing the Obligational Legitimacy
Hypothesis, it will be useful to employ the argument
analysis constructed above to highlight the weaknesses of
the present efforts in the study of transition theory
(discussed in Chapter 1) . Figure 3 presents, in causal
form, the four main attempts to explain transitions. "A"
highlights the weakness of attaching direct causal
inference between one (or more) factors external to the
military regime and transition itself. No effort is made
to look from inside the military out, especially at the
24 The material cause concerns itself with the origin
of the entity in question. As Aristotle explained, "Oak
trees do not grow out of hazel nuts, but only from acorns.
And if they are sown in sandy soil on the ocean front. . .
they will always remain scrub growth.' 1 (quoted in John
Herman Randall, Aristotle , (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1960), p. 52.) Similarly, transition from military
rule in South America has a specific environment and seed
of origin from which it springs. The formal cause is
concerned with structure. As a regime moves toward
transition from power, the regime structure will change to
manifest this movement and the "why" of the transition will
be answered specifically in the change of obligational
legitimacy. The efficient cause is concerned with process
(in this case, how the transition evolved) and is the
easiest of the four divisions of understanding to directly
observe. The final cause is concerned with what something
tends to become. In the case of transitions, the final
cause is concerned with liberalization or totalitarian















































































































































metaphysical level. 2 ^ "B" models the faulty assumption of
tying factors external to the military directly to
liberalization, skipping the transition phenomena all
together. 26 "C" manifests the easiest and most popular
research agenda, assuming transition and just looking at
liberalization with no concern for factors that caused the
transition that may also affect liberalization. 27 Finally,
"D" highlights the research agenda that concerns itself
only with how and little inference as to why the transition
occurred. 28
25 See footnotes 9 and 11 for representative studies
of this causal model.
26 See footnotes 13 and 14 for representative studies
that conform to this causal model.
27 See footnote 15 for representative studies that
conform to this type of causal model.
28 See footnote 16 for a representative study that
conforms to this causal model.
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III. PERPETUATION OF MILITARY REGIMES
Before constructing the Obligational Legitimacy
Hypothesis with the logic and methodology presented in
Chapter 2, it is important to fully appreciate the natural
friction inherent in military regimes moving toward
transitions from power. As Chapter 1 highlights, until
recently, scholars have centered their studies on the rise
of civilian rule, not why (or if) military regimes choose
to let transitions take place. The military regime's
tendency to want to remain in power does not mean the
regime is directly pushed out of power by forces external
to it, although these factors may play an important role.
The very fact that there are many influences supporting
their stay in government highlights the need for change to
take place within the military. In other words, factors
external to the regime will not, by themselves, initiate
transition. There are four obvious general factors that
support perpetuation of military regimes in power in Latin
America, historical tendencies, cultural traditions, armed
might, and institutional forces.
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A. HISTORICAL TENDENCIES
The historical pattern over the past two decades
particularly highlights civilian rule as the exception.
For example, from 1946 to 1984, Argentina saw 27 years of
military rule. Bolivia has had 18 years of military rule in
the same time period. Brazil recently transitioned from 21
years of military rule. Chile and Paraguay have endured
(and continue to endure) military dictatorships for 14 and
33 years respectively. Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay have each
had military interventions, adding up to at least ten years
in each case, since the mid 1960s. Table 1 presents a
further illustration of the historical tendency of military
rule in South America.
B. CULTURAL TRADITION
Closely connected to the historical pattern of military
intervention is the influence of culture. At the extreme
end of the cultural influence theory spectrum is the
cultural determinism suggested by Jeane Kirkpatrick. She
asserts that Latin America is inherently authoritarian in
nature; they like order. 29 Although her argument is
flawed (maybe there is just a dislike of disorder, as
29 Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double
Standards," Commentary
. November 1979, pp. 34-45.
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TABLE l 30
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RULE
IN SOUTH AMERICA 1946-1984





as a % of
period 1946-
1984
Argentina 27 11 .711
Bolivia 18 20 .474
Brazil 20 18 .526
Chile 11 27 .289
Paraguay 30 8 .789
Peru 20 18 .526
Uruguay 11 27 .289
30 Table 1 information extracted from Talukder
Maniruz zaman , Military Withdrawal From Politics ,
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 224-231.
(Maniruzzaman classifies the first Peron era as military
rule because his first entry into power was through a
military coup d' etat in 1943.)
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Howard Wiarda suggests 31 ) , her point highlights a traceable
cultural tendency toward centralism. Latin intellectuals,
disillusioned with the failure of liberal democracy after
independence, were the first to conclude that "Hispanic
culture stressed strong leadership, centralized government,
and an organic, hierarchical view of society...." 32 From
this general viewpoint, theories including praetorianism
(the armed forces act as a corporate body to maintain
control of government) , caudillismo (rule by traditional
military leaders) , caesarism (rule by a single charismatic
leader who is usually a military officer), and Laswell's
Garrison State model (society transfers almost unlimited
power to the military due to continual chaos, crisis or
external threat) gained wide popularity and acceptance.
Whether these theories are completely applicable or not is
open to debate. What is certain, culture does play a role
in supporting military intervention and maintenance as a
power broker in government. Glen Dealy's "Spirit of
Caudillaje" (a lifestyle oriented toward the goals and
values of public leadership) 33
, the Catholic Ethos and the
31 Howard J. Wiarda, "The Origins of the Crisis in
Central America," Rift and Revolution . ed. Howard J.




32 Ernest Rossi and Jack C. Piano, The Latin American
Political Dictionary
. (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1980), p. 67.
33 Glen Dealy, The Public Man
.
(Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1977), p. 3.
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Iberian Continuum all support the tendency of militarism in
Latin America. If militarism is the tendency, then maybe
the question should be, "why not more and longer military
interventions?"
C. ARMED MIGHT
At first glance, the logic is very strong against
transitions from military rule given Latin American
military historical propensity to intervene. S.E. Finer
points out,
The armed forces then are not only the most highly
organized association in the state. They are a
continuing corporation with an intense sentiment of
solidarity, enjoying, in many case, considerable favor.
This formidable corporate body is more lethally and
heavily armed than any other organization in the state,




Even in the face of frustrated public opinion, as in
Somoza's Nicaragua, Pinochet's Chile, Galtieri's Argentina
and Bermundez ' Peru, the military holds the physical power
to continue ruling. Although an unpopular civilian regime
may not last long, an unpopular military regime (willing to
use its coercive power) can seemingly continue ruling
indefinitely. Closely related to the military's coercive
power, are other unique capabilities (categorized here
because they depend on armed might) that dilute the
potential for transition. These militaries claim a unique
34 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback The Role of the
Military in Politics , (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 12.
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mission in society, a sacred trust, including the need to
govern in order to save the nation. Most South American
militaries manifest the influence of Prussian training
(such as in the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Uruguay) . The French doctrine de la guerre revolutionaire
(especially influential in Peru due to the French military
training mission established there in 1896) also has left
its impact. Combining these two influential traditions
with the United States' emphasis on internal security in
the post World War Two era, most Latin American militaries
add a well defined internal security perspective to their
sacred trust, 35 further entangling themselves in govern-
mental affairs. Corporate self-interests, personal self-
interests, fear of retribution for repression and social
regression, and other uncertainties of liberalization also
support continuance of military rule.
D. COHERENT INSTITUTION IN CHAOTIC SOCIETY
Finally, institutional steadiness, not radical change,
or instability, is the descriptive characteristic of most
enduring organizations, including militaries. In the face
of strong external stimuli to leave government, Latin
American militaries have additional institutional forces,
35 Alexandre de S.C. Barros and Edmundo C. Coelho,
"Military Intervention and Withdrawal," Armies and Politics
in Latin America , ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel
Fitch, (New York: Homes and Meier, 1986), p. 441.
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including commitment on the individual level, organiza-
tional culture on the corporate level, and the self-
perpetuation of power phenomena and structural underemploy-
ment on the societal level, that tend to perpetuate
continuance in government. On the most basic level of
institutional forces is the factor of commitment.
Commitment, that "state of being in which an individual
becomes bound by his actions and through these actions to
beliefs that sustain the activities and his own in-
volvement," 36 is a behavioral phenomena of great influence
in the context of military regimes. This concept is
particularly important to a military organization that
commits itself to an irrevocable action, as did Argentina's
military regime during its "dirty war." 37 As this
individual phenomena of commitment expands to encompass an
entire military organization, or even part of it, the
tendency to remain in power further solidifies.
36 Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power in Organizations ,
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1981), p. 290.
37
"Suppose an individual believes something with his
whole heart, suppose further that he has a commitment to
this belief and that he has taken irrevocable actions
because of it. Finally suppose that he is presented with
evidence, unequivocal and undeniable evidence, that his
belief is wrong: what will happen? The individual will
frequently emerge not only unshaken, but even more
convinced of the truth of his beliefs than ever before.
Indeed, he may even show new fervor for convincing and
converting other people to his view." Leon Festinger, H.W.
Riecken, and S. Schacter, When Prophecy Fails ,
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956), p. 3.
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Above the individual level, on the broader corporate
spectrum, is a second perpetuating force of institutionali-
zation, organizational culture. Traditions, standard
operating procedures, patterns of authority, etc., after a
time take on the status of objective social fact. Rules of
operation, decisions and distribution of power are not
questioned by the individual members. The historical
tendencies and cultural traditions supporting military rule
have become tightly interwoven into the fabric of Latin
American military organizations, making organizational
culture a key factor in the transition process. 38 This
may be a pivotal factor in Chile's current military
regime.
On the societal level (of which the military organiza-
tion is a key player in Latin America) , the self-perpetua-
tion of power phenomena is an important force. Simply put,
power enables those who possess it to get things such as
wealth, information, and opportunity that others can't
obtain in order to build their strength and privilege. In
Latin America, the various societal components of many
countries have historically tended to define their
interests in "zero-sum" terms and the perpetuation in power
of the ruling group therefore became especially important
for the continued realization of their self interests.
38 See Chapter 5 for an explanation of organizational
culture, including its pivotal role in the military
transition from power process.
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This demonstrated unwillingness of societal actors to
compromise and negotiate has led, at best, to exclusionary
democracy and tension, such as in Brazil's Democratic
Republic, 1945-1964. In other situations it has led to
governmental stagnation and ensuing chaos, such as during
the most recent Peronist years in Argentina, 1973-1976. In
every case it has, at some point, led to a rise in military
authoritarianism. As a corporate entity, they historically
have had the highest organized technical abilities in most
countries and were the best educated and trained in
society. Today they are still qualitatively competitive
with educated middle and upper class civilians and
quantitatively have the largest pool of mobilized and
controlled labor to harness. Also, following bureaucratic
authoritarian reasoning, the military is the only corporate
entity in society that can organize and control a country
to achieve painful economic modernizations, or simply bring
order to a chaotic political society. The exclusionary
narcism of the various factions in civilian society are not
the only self-interest forces supporting military rule.
When the military itself, with its unique capabilities to
establish its power, comes to define its interests as
fundamentally incongruent with the rest of society, their
willingness to perpetuate and protect their power becomes a
key coagulant inhibiting the move toward a transition from
rule. Add to this, the Latin American militaries'
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perennial problem of "structural underemployment" 39 (i.e.
the armed forces do not have their major role to perform in
society due to the lack of external threats and society has
nothing else to offer them) when not in government, and the
interest of self-perpetuation in power becomes a formidable
force.
39 Barros and Coelho, "Military Intervention and
Withdrawal," Armies and Politics in Latin America , p. 440.
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IV. TRANSITION THEORY: DEPENDENT VARIABLE40
The influences inhibiting military ruler regimes from
transitioning from government are numerous and originate
from sources outside and inside the military organization.
Theories that link transition simply with external
influences cannot fully explain what must be closer to the
actual process. The fact that the military holds a
monopoly on coercive power in society and that the regime
has all these forces influencing it to stay in power,
highlights the more probable situation; transition
initiation begins as an event internal to the military
itself. With the methodology discussed in Chapter 2, this
study will present and analyze obligational legitimacy as
the pivotal internal factor that leads the military to the
decision of withdrawing from power.
40 The basic data of this chapter is derived from
interviews and the personal writings (utilized in a strict
non-attribution context) of mid and senior level Latin
American military officers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela during the period 1986-
1987. Very few of the terms used in this chapter were
specifically used by these officers, but do summarize the
issues and assumptions underlying their views.
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A. WHY "OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY?"
Between historical tendencies, cultural tradition, a
near-monopoly on coercive power, unique capabilities,
sacred duty, corporate and self-interests and fears,
commitment, institutionalization of organizational culture,
self-perpetuation of power and otherwise structural
underemployment, one must wonder why transitions from
military governments ever occur. Causal forces external to
the military certainly cannot fully explain transitions
from military rule. The key to military transitions then,
must have its origin within the military itself. But what
is it in the military (the key assertion) that leads to a
transition from military domination of government? Is that
entity that brought the military to power changing? What
justified the military to take over government in the
first place? How can we come to terms with the common
theme of these questions? Max Weber offered a way to at
least start an inquiry of such regimes. He suggested,
...according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed,
the type of obedience, kind of administrative staff
developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising
authority, will differ fundamentally. . . . Hence, it is
useful to classify the types of domination according to
the kind of claim to legitimacy.... 41
Following Weber's suggestion, this study looks at the type
of legitimacy characterizing ruler regimes in South
41 Max Weber, Economy and Society , ed. Guenther
Roth and Claus Wittich, (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978), p. 213.
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America. In fact, this hypothesis places "obligational
legitimacy," and its breakdown, as the causal model's
dependent variable and ultimate cause of transition from
military rule. Obligational legitimacy is defined as,
support, acquiescence, and consent for actions (up to and
including coercion) , motivated by subjective agreement
that the military regime has the duty and obligation to
rule, by those belonging to the military organization.
Obligational legitimacy is so named to highlight its
difference from other types of legitimacy. It differs from
other concepts of legitimacy, first and foremost, because
it is solely internal to the military organization. It
does not describe a direct feedback relationship between
the regime and society. Obligational legitimacy is the
pivotal factor between status quo military rule and
transition because the military regime is made up of
individuals with the need to understand, however correct or
incorrect, the world around them. These understandings are
necessary to provide enough predictability to take action
as a government and enough obligational legitimacy asso-
ciated with the action to make it justifiable and meaning-
ful . To remove the nebulous and mystical shroud thus far
covering this entity, its origins will first be discussed
through defining its "essence"—what it is and does.
Secondly, the characterizing structure of obligational
legitimacy will be clarified by specific investigation of
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its most basic components to understand the "why" of this
unique entity. A survey of contrasting literature will
also be conducted to further highlight the differing
characteristics of obligational legitimacy. Next, the
process of how obligational legitimacy is created, how it
is sustained, and how it breaks down will be outlined.
Finally, a proposal of what it becomes after transition
will be put forward.
B. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY CONCEPTS
To appreciate the role of obligational legitimacy, we
must first comprehend what it is and what it does. The
foundation concepts of the words " legitimacy.!' and "obliga-
tional," which form its bipartite whole, express its
essence. Legitimacy in this context connotes a different
idea from more generally understood definitions of
legitimacy. The commonly accepted concept of legitimacy,
as a two—way relationship between the rulers and the
ruled, is relegated to the role of an independent variable
in this hypothesis. 42 Otto von Bismark offers the best
definition for legitimacy in the context of obligational
legitimacy. He explained that,
Power itself, rather than any moral principles,
establishes a leader's legitimate authority. Since power
stops discord, keeps the rulers in office, and maintains
42 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the traditional
concept of legitimacy and its role as a causal factor
influencing obligational legitimacy.
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order, coercive power conveys a moral value. The
skillful exercise of power provides its own
legitimacy. 43
This definition of legitimacy is particularly applicable
because the concepts of support, acquiescence and consent
attached to most definitions of legitimacy are here linked
only to "the rulers in office." In other words, this
legitimacy is internal to the military and does not
describe the normal two-way relationship between society
and the military. This concept clearly makes the point
that the interests of the state transcend more abstract
principles of legitimacy. Coercive power is a key element
in this definition and, in fact, could be termed "coercive
power legitimacy" which is operable only by, or with, the
military. Bismark's definition does manifest a belief that
a "skillful" evaluation of power would yield to some
concern for self-limitation. This study will attempt to
show about Latin American militaries what Dr. Kissinger
points out about Bismark. Bismark felt that "what was at
issue was not a policy but a philosophy." 44
The definition of obligational legitimacy is concerned
with the military's justification of its right to rule, and
this "might makes right" definition of legitimacy (with the
only caveat being a skillful exercise of power) encompasses
43 Henry A. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary:






more than just the miliary-as-government possibility.
"Obligational, " therefore, becomes an important qualifying
concept. "Obligational" is defined as, "a duty that
compels one to follow or avoid a certain course of
action." 45 Inherent in this definition is the requirement
for someone to do something. A person or group cannot
simply have an obligation, they have an obligation to do a
certain thing. The obligation the military has in this
context is to take control of government and maintain their
rule.
Explanation for the necessity of this obligation stems
from both moral and nonmoral motivations. Nonmoral
obligation may involve such factors as social pressures, 46
physical compulsion, 47 and prudential necessity 48 .
Nonmoral obligational motivation is intertwined with the
more important moral motivating factors of obligation.
Moral obligation springs from prima facie, "hypothetical,"
45 The American Heritage Dictionary . rev. ed.
,
(1973), s.v. "obligation."
46 An example of this would be society requesting
military intervention such as in Chile in 1973 and in
Argentina in 1976.
47 An example of this is the desire for riches and/or
power which has perhaps motivated some in almost every
military regime.
48 An example of this is a perceived threat to the
military organization itself (such as the fear of an armed
and mobilized left in Allende's Chile) , or a group within
that organization (such as the concern of the officer corp
in Brazil of the attempted political mobilization of the
noncommissioned officer corps)
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and "categorical" obligation. Prima facie obligation is
used in regard to self evident duty. If a contract is
agreed upon, then the parties have a prima facie obligation
to uphold that contract, unless a higher prima facie duty
requires a different action. An example of prima facie
duties within the context of the military-as-government is
the constitutional obligation of the Brazilian military to
ensure a balance between the branches of government. 49
Hypothetical obligation, on the other hand, is dependent on
whether one desires the result of doing an act. In this
context, motivation and obligation coincide. An example of
this type of obligation is the aggressive agrarian reform
program of the Velasco regime in Peru. 50 Finally,
categorical obligations can be described as unconditional.
Whereas hypothetical obligations stem from doing an act
because the consequences are desirable, categorical
obligation requires acting upon a maxim that is thought to
be for all men at all times. Obligation and motivation
need not coincide. In fact, a person may not even want to
fulfill the obligation, but must due to a higher law. An
example of a categorical obligation is the post coup
repression in Chile. It had to be done (in order to
eradicate the communist threat) whether or not the act of
49 Stepan, The Military In Politics , p. 75
50 Gary W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American





repression itself was desirable or not. 51 It is important
to note that one person's hypothetical obligation is
another's categorical imperative (or physical compulsion,
etc. )
.
C- OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY STRUCTURE
The structure of obligational legitimacy must first be
understood in the context of its existence in a military
organization. Figure 4 represents any military, with the
identifying characteristics of coercive power and an








Conceptual Representation of a Military Organization
Figure 4
51 This is highlighted by the actions of the Chilean
military allowing newsmen and representatives of various
international organizations to initially investigate what
had been done, assuming they too would understand the need
to use this type of force to "expatriate Marxism from
Chile." Paul E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende
.
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), p. 253.
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This common identity is termed irreducible because it is
the basic metaphysical assumptions of the organization. It
is within this irreducible common identity that obligation-
al legitimacy resides. Coercive power is empirical and
therefore easy to measure and understand. Common identity,
let alone its "obligational" component, is much more
difficult to comprehend. Cesar Caviedes admits, "Very
little is known. . . about the way in which military-civilian
relations are viewed by the military themselves and how
this perception tends to influence their behavior once they
are in power." 52 Common identity, in general, is the
"social cement" that binds people together. It answers the
basic questions, How do I define "self?" How^ do I fit in?
How is this society different from others? Who is the
enemy and who is our friend? What are "good" goals? How
do we achieve "good" goals? In other words, common
identity is the focal point for all civil interactions.
Edward Shills defines common identity as the "central
zone" of a society. He explains that this central zone,
...is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs.
It is the center of the order of symbols, of values and
beliefs, which govern society. It is the center because
it is the ultimate and irreducible.... The central zone
partakes of the nature of the sacred. In this sense,
every society has an "official" religion, even when that
society or its exponents and interpreters conceive of it,
52 Cesar Caviedes, The Southern Cone , (Totowa, NJ
Rowan and Allenheld Publishers, 1984), p. 137.
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more or less correctly, as a secular, pluralistic, and
tolerant society. 53
It is relatively easy to transpose this concept to the
military organization. To understand the military then,
and more particularly the obligational legitimacy of Latin
American militaries, we need to look closer at their
"ultimate, irreducible official religion." As already
pointed out, it is difficult to pinpoint the ultimate
identity of a closed organization like the military,
primarily because it is protective of its inner workings
and very little empirical data is available for analysis.
Yet a military regime must make assumptions, either
purposely or subconsciously through their actions, about
what is reality, what is "good," and how is the "good"
achieved. Answers to these concerns are provided at lower
levels of specificity by organizational culture (the
organizational memory bank) 54 and mission orientation (the
general view of reality) 55 . In other words, when the
military reacts to a issue, they are interpreting it
through their mission orientation, coming up with a
53 Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," The Logic of
Personal Knowledge, Essays Presented to Karl Polanyi
.
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 117. as quoted
in Charles F. Andrain, Political Life and Social Change
.
(Belmont, CA. : Duxbury Press, 1975), p. 55.
54 For an explanation of organizational culture, see
Chapter 5
.
55 For an explanation of mission orientation, see
Chapter 5.
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solution through theories incorporated within the bounds of
mission orientation and weighing that solution in terms of
organizational culture. It is tempting to explain all
issues on these levels. Ultimately though, all critical
issues are weighed in terms of shared values which make up
the military's irreducible common identity.
Shared values characterize the irreducible meta-
physical assumptions of the military's common identity and
set the trajectory for the norms, expressive symbols, etc.
within organizational culture and mission orientation. The
shared values of the military common identity are highly
general concepts of the desirable and set the criteria for
deciding courses and action. The military regime may never
fully realize these values in actual situations due to
their abstract nature and the complex linkages that connect
them to specific application. These values are also
complex in themselves as they stem from numerous sources
including, 1) primordial values (first order attachments-
--biological family), 2) sacred values (religious,
ideological), 3) personal values (common attachments that




This structural view of obligational legitimacy
highlights four very important points. First, obliga-
tional legitimacy can only exist in the military organiza-
56 Andrain, Political Life and Social Change , pp. 59-64.
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tion. This is because in contemporary Latin American
society, only the military has the two main components of
obligational legitimacy, (first, a zealous sense of duty
and second, a unique internal view of legitimacy that
relies in the final analysis on coercive power) . Any
ruling organization in society, except the military, must
either rely on a definition of legitimacy that transcends
the bounds of the organization itself and accept society's
judgement, or, if deemed illegitimate by society, reject
society's notion and gain the support of the military to
continue rule. 57 This form of civilian authoritarian rule
in which the military has been the pawn of an elite group,
or acts solely as an arbitrator, has been rejected by the
southern cone militaries (manifested by the defining
characteristics of military ruler-type regimes) . The keys
to the rejection of their old roles and acceptance of new
roles are found in the common identity of the military
regime.
A second point that follows from the structural
context of obligational legitimacy is, it applies only to a
military in power. A military out of power is out of power
for one, or both, of two reasons. First, the military may
not have a monopoly on coercive power to implement the
57 Examples of this include: Batista in Cuba and
Somoza in Nicaragua who at one point had at least a
shallow claim to some legal legitimacy, but later on
maintained their rule through the support and loyalty of
their respective military and national guard.
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concepts inherent in obligational legitimacy. 58 Second, a
military out of power may also lack the obligational common
identity (due to different traditions, training, social
context, experience, etc.) to justify taking power and
maintaining power. 59 If both the coercive power and
obligational legitimacy are present, it is postulated that
the military will seize power. In short, obligational
legitimacy applies only to a military regime in power that
has first, the capability to "skillfully" exercise coercive
power and secondly, a will, through obligational common
identity, to exert that power to achieve and maintain their
rule.
The third point we can derive from this structural
understanding of obligational legitimacy is, this form of
legitimacy has some common structural characteristics with
other types of legitimacy. Both obligational legitimacy
and the common concept of legitimacy, which this study
terms external legitimacy, are claims of validity. Both
types of legitimacy continue as long as a common identity
58 An example of this situation is: Mexico in the
1920s and 1930s when peasant militias who were called up by
the standing government to put down a number of coup
attempts by the military. See Frederick M Nunn "On the
Role of the Military in Twentieth-Century Latin America:
The Mexican Case," and Edwin Lieuwen, "Depoliticization of
the Mexican Revolutionary Army, 1915-1940," Both in The
Modern Mexican Military: A Reassment . ed. David Ronfeldt,
(San Diego: Center for U. S . -Mexican Studies, University of
California, 1984), pp. 33-62.
59 An example of this type of military is found in
the United States.
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exists; external legitimacy from social agreements and
related collective identities; obligational legitimacy from
within the military. Therefore, if external legitimacy
"validates the claim to preserve a determined social
identity and justifies the establishment of mechanisms and
institutions ready to employ political power for that
purpose," 60 obligational legitimacy (altering Caviendes 1
same thought) validates the claim to preserve a determined
obligational common identity and justifies the
establishment of mechanisms and institutions ready to
employ coercive power for that purpose.
A final and perhaps most important discovery of this
structural (formal cause) investigation of obligational
legitimacy is the opportunity now open to us to answer the
metaphysical questions central to South American
militaries 1 common identities. From the previous section
in this chapter and the additional insights of this
section, we can complete the following query: Why does
obligational legitimacy exist? To justify establishment
and maintenance of rule. Why justify rule? To bind the
military organization together for a task beyond the
traditional bounds of a professional military. Why rule?
The military perceives an obligation to do so. Why does
the military have this obligation? Obligation, as we know,
springs from various sources, both nonmoral and moral.
60 Caviedes, The Southern Cone
. p. 136.
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Obligational legitimacy is characterized by an irredu-
cible, metaphysical common identity though, which must
include some type of value (moral) considerations. We can
therefore conclude that the military perceives a justi-
fiable obligation to establish and maintain power due
mainly to moral necessity.
Obligational moral necessity to intervene in government
is supported by both hypothetically and categorically
aligned officers, both of which conclude that the military
is the only organization in society able and willing to
save the country from chaos, decay and almost certain
destruction. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed
Forces of Peru issued a Manifesto upon taking power in 1968
which manifests this obligational concern. After identi-
fying the enemies of the state, the Manifesto states,
The actions of the Revolutionary Government are inspired
by the necessity of transforming the structure of the
state to permit efficient government action to transform
social, economic and cultural structures, [and by the
necessity] to maintain a definite nationalist attitude, a
clearly independent position, and the defense of national
sovereignty and dignity. [It is inspired in the
necessity] of fully reestablishing the principles of
authority, respect for and obedience to the law, the
dominion of justice and morality in all areas of national
life 61
Officers who see their duty to intervene as categorically
imperative are usually in the minority. They must sway, or
61 La Prensa , (3 October 1968) , as quoted in Liisa
North and Tanya Korovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and the
Officers in Power 1967-1976 , (Montreal: Centre for
Developing Area Studies, McGill University, 1981), p. 5.
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hope for factors external to the military to influence, the
majority of the officer corps to the same conclusion.
Brazilian General Golbery do Couto e Silva highlights this
point with the following comment:
Military activists for or against the government are
always a minority. If a military group wants to
overthrow a government, they need to convince the great
majority of officers who are either strict legalists or
simply nonactivists. Activists do not wish to risk
bloodshed or military splits, so they wait until a
consensus has developed. 62
General Aguirre, Secretary of Public Administration during
most of the Rodriguez regime in Ecuador (1972-1979) made a
similar point when he explained,
The 1963-66 experience was not a favorable one. This
hardened our resolve not to intervene until the situation
had become critical ... we were prepared to wait until
things got out of hand .... Civilian elements had a
direct influence upon members of the Armed Forces, after
the second year . . . especially those individuals that did
not want or were never asked to participate in a military
government .... Their influence was strongest ... on
those members of the armed forces that did not occupy
political or administrative positions .... They create a
sense within the military that the armed forces should
not participate in politics.... 63
The majority, who are finally swayed to common identity
with the activists (those who see the military's duty as
62 Interview with General Golbery as quoted in Stepan,
The Military in Politics , p. 97. Stepan suggests here that
the important point is the need for supportive public
opinion to initiate a coup. This study suggests that
public opinion is only one of numerous causal factors that
influence the majority of the officer corp to the same
conclusion as those military activists.
63 General Aguirre, interview, 21 February 1983, as
quoted in Anita J. Isaacs, "From Military to Civilian
Rule: Ecuador, 1972-1979," (D. Phil. dissertation, St.
Anthony's College, University of Oxford, 1985), p. 45.
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categorically obligational) , cannot be considered identical
to the activists. Some of this majority accept the
categorical outlook, but most only acknowledge a hypo-
thetical obligation to intervene. The rallying point of
both groups, though, is the common acceptance that they,
and only they, have the ability and will to save the
country. If they don't do it, it won't get done.
D. CONTRASTING LITERATURE
To better understand the pivotal role obligational
legitimacy plays in transitions from military rule, a
survey of potentially conflicting literature will be
helpful. Adam Przeworski postulates,
The 'loss of legitimacy' theory is an 'up' theory of
regime transformation in the sense that it postulates
that the regime first loses its legitimacy in the civil
society; [then] the ruling bloc responds.... if this
theory is valid, one would expect to observe mass unrest




Przeworski applies legitimacy to a much broader context
than obligational legitimacy allows. His application of
legitimacy is only one causal condition in obligational
legitimacy theory, and (as this study hopes to show) is
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. O'Donnell,
Finer, and Rouquie concern themselves with the initial
64 Adam Przeworski, "Problems in the Study of
Transition to Democracy," Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives , eds. Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 50.
67
illegitimacy of military regimes when they come to power.
O'Donnell and Schmitter state that these regimes "will
have to make use, [once in power] of some degree or some
form of electoral legitimation." 65 Finer states, "They
seek, in short, to exercise a right to govern; or, as the
expression goes, to legitimize themselves." 66 Rouquie
comments that the militaries, despite what they say, know
that a superior legitimacy exists in constitutional order,
and their only legitimacy exists by virtue of their future
performance. 67 These scholars are also using legitimacy in
a broader sense than in the context of obligational
legitimacy. Not only do some military regimes have a high
degree of legitimacy in civil society when coming to power-
—such as in Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976 (in both
cases possibly higher than the previously elected govern-
ments) —they were also obligationally legitimate upon
assuming control of the government. As in the case of
Chile in 1973 and Argentina in 1976, the military hesitated
before coming to power even though there was a strong
feeling within civil society of their legitimate right to
65 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Opening Authoritarian
Regimes," Transitions from Authoritarian Regimes: Tentative
Conclusions
, p. 16.
66 S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback , p. 18.
67 Rouquie, "Demilitarization and the
Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Polities in
Latin America," Armies and Politics in Latin America ,
p. 447.
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do so. Not until they were obligationally legitimate did
they seize power. 68 The same can be considered to be true
at the other end of the transition spectrum: not until the
military regime is obligationally illegitimate does their
transition from power take place.
When individual or corporate rationalization can no
longer justify the actions of a military regime, obliga-
tional legitimacy breaks down, stimulating a move toward
transition. Events internal and external to the regime,
and their causal explanations, affect the obligational
legitimacy of the regime. These causal events, the
independent variables, can hypothesize, predict and explain
shifts in the dependent variable, obligational legitimacy,
because they are the proximate causes of obligational
legitimacy change. Obligational legitimacy, in turn, is
the decisive final element in the chain of controls that
68 No study has attempted to define this dependent
variable, but many studies' conclusions are valuable
indicators of this fact none the less. Sigmund, The
Overthrow of Allende , pp. 212-215; highlights the Chilean
military, in the June 1973 aborted revolt, as not unified
and still unsure in its mission orientation in this rising
social chaos. Certainly this manifests an obligational
legitimacy still in formation. In interviews with senior
officers from Argentina, the thought was suggested that
even though legitimacy within society was strong for the
military to return to power in 1976, not until the senior
leadership at the time felt the military was sufficiently
unified in their own concept of what needed to be done once
returning to power, did the military act. This was not to
be like past military regimes. They were going to stay in
power because they had an ideal, whereas no one else in
society even had an ideal, let alone a wrong ideal.
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supports military maintenance of rule or transition
initiation. 69
E. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY CREATION
The formation of obligational legitimacy is an
evolutionary reaction, through the perceptions of the
military, to the ideas and manifest interests of the
various groups in Latin American society. Concerning the
various societal groups, George Philip points out that the
divisions in Latin American society are on the basis of
class rather than religion, race, or region. These class
differences may divide society, but they are likely to
unite the officer corp of the military, 70 due to their
overwhelmingly middle class make-up. It is the officer
corps that establishes the direction the military will take
in almost every situation, on and off the battlefield. The
military organizational culture (hierarchy, centralized
69 For example, North and Korovkin conclude in their
study on the 1967-1976 Peruvian military regime, that a key
factor in the regime's final decision to initiate a
transition stems from the concept of obligational
legitimacy (although they do not attempt to define the
concept) . They state, "Neither the unity of goal nor the
coercive will, not that understanding of political power
existed within the Peruvian Revolutionary Government of the
Armed Forces." North and Korovkin, The Peruvian Revolution
and the Officers in Power 1967-1976 . p. 100.
70 George Philip, "Military Rule in South America:
The Dilemmas of Authoritarianism," The Political Dilemmas
of Military Regimes , ed. Christopher Clapham and George




control, sense of duty, discipline, self-policing, etc)
reinforces the pivotal influence of the officer corps in
the military organization. Much of what the officer corp
sees in society around them is anathema to the core values
and beliefs of a professional military. Latin American
societies have been described by military officers as lazy,
undisciplined, untrustworthy, corrupt, ineffectual, and
conflictual, but important to note, these societies are
also considered misguided and teachable. 71
The officer corp is not monolithic in its concept of
what to do with society. As Max Weber pointed out in his
study of domination systems (of which the officer corps are
certainly examples) , there is a ruling minority and an
apparatus. 72 In the context of this study, the apparatus
(the military organization) obeys the ruling minority (the
military regime) and the people at large obey both the
ruling minority and the apparatus. This distinction within
the military is important because it is the ruling elite
who establish the metaphysical common identity for the
71 These descriptive terms were collected from
interviews of senior and mid level Latin American officers
who were asked to describe the society they are sworn to
defend. Almost every officer agreed that society was not
hopeless, that they were misguided and could be taught.
72 Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual
Portrait
.
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1962), p. 293.
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military as a whole. 73 They are also generally those in
the military organization who see the military obligation
to rule as categorical. The apparatus, in general, only
concerns itself with the general view of reality, 74 built
upon a hypothetical obligation concept.
The subset of the common identity that evolves into
obligational legitimacy is a synthesis of the real
interests of the hypothetical imperative developed by the
apparatus, and the ideal interests of the categorical
imperative of the ruling elite. Together these interests
form an operable common will. Otto Hintze explains the
importance of this synthesis:
All human action arises from a common source, in
political as well as in religious life. Everywhere the
first impulse to social action is given as a rule by real
interests, i.e., by political and economic interests.
But ideal interests lend wings to these real interests,
give them a spiritual meaning, and serve to justify them.
Man does not live by bread alone. He wants to have a
good conscience as he pursues his life-interests. And in
pursuing them he develops his capacities to the highest
extent only if he believes that in so doing he serves a
higher rather than a purely egotistic purpose. Interests
without such "spiritual wings" are lame; but on the other
hand, ideas can win out in history only if and insofar as
they are associated with real interests .... Wherever
interests are vigorously pursued, an ideology tends to be
developed also to give meaning, re-enforcement and
justification to these interests. And conversely;
73 Examples of this ruling minority include the well
known professors of Geopolitics and architects in their
own countries of National Security and Development, General
Golbery of Brazil and General Pinochet of Chile.
74 The "general view of reality" would include such
mind sets as National Security Doctrine and Geopolitics.
Although these ideas take a specific stand, they are not
generally understood or discussed at the metaphysical level.
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wherever ideas are to conquer the world, they require the
leverage of real interests, ... 75
The real interests of this synthesis include the desire
for order over chaos, a hypersensitive affinity to "La
Patria," national development, and saving the nation from
corruption and the threat of communism. 76 The ideal
interests include the philosophy of geopolitics77 (from
which the guiding philosophy of National Security Doctrine
evolves 78 ), and the superiority of the military in
society. 79 This superiority is explained by General
Pinochet as stemming from the military culture. He
explains, "Culture is the real intellectual nature,
75 Felix Gilbert, ed. , The Historical Essays of Otto
Hintze
.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 94.
76 Rossi and Piano, The Latin American Political
Dictionary , pp. 133-138.
77
"Geopolitics, as General Golbery has said, can be
quite appropriately considered as a type of synthesis of
the organicism of Herder, the idealism of Hegel, the
statism of Fichte, and the economic nationalism of List."
Arzobispado de Santiago de Chile, Dos Ensayos Sobre
Seguridad Nacional , trans. James Droste. (Santiago de
Chile, 1979), pp. 29-30.
78 The Archbishopric of Santiago suggests this by
citing the authors of National Security Doctrine in
Brazil, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, and Chile,
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, were first geopoliticians.
Arzobispado de Santiago de Chile, Dos Ensayos Sobre
Seguridad Nacional . p. 29. Jack Child provides evidence to
support this view in Jack Child, "Geopolitical Thinking,"
to be published in Civil Military Relations in Latin
America: The Military and Power , ed. Louis W. Goodman and
Juan Rial, forthcoming.
79 Or as the military in Chile is called by Pinochet,
"the chosen ones."
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whereas civilization is merely mechanization." 80 This
culture and training brings with it certain obligations
that further separates the military from the rest of
society. Ortega y Gasset explains that society is made up
of the "mass man" who drifts , lacking purpose, and though
his possibilities are great, he constructs nothing. The
excellent man (the military in this context) , by way of
contrast, is driven to appeal to a standard higher than
himself, and therefore strives to ever improve. His
nobility is defined by its demands, not by privileges
gained. 81
The demands placed on the military throughout their
history in South America have played a key role in the
development of obligational legitimacy. Specifically, the
interests of both the military ruling elite and the
apparatus have evolved over a long historical process. As
society in Latin America changed, so did the concepts the
military maintained to operate as the protector of that
society. The military as a commonweal organization82
80 Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Introduction to
Geopolitics , translated by Liselotte Schwarzenberg Matthei,
(Santiago de Chile: Alfabeta Impresores, 1981), p. 145.
81 Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses ,
trans, anonymous. (London: Unwin Books, 1961), P. 48.
82 One of the characteristics of the military
corporate identity as suggested by authors, such as Samuel
P Huntington, "Officership as a Profession," The Political
Influence of the Military , ed. Amos Perlmutter and Valerie
Bennett, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 43.,
is, its interest in the common good and welfare, also known
74
evolved as society itself was transformed because the
military was constantly placed in a position that required
it to have a knowledge capable of making judgments
concerning society. As the "metaphysics of experience"
explains, "Intuitions without concepts are blind, concepts
without intuitions are empty. The understanding can
intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only
through their union can knowledge arise." 83 After
independence, the reality of most Latin American countries
was, state first and nation later. The military model
developed to meet this realty was the personalistic
caudillo leader and a loyal, but unprofessional army. By
the turn of the century, foreign military missions were
established, such as the Prussian Colonel Korner in Chile
(1886-1910) and the French in Peru (1896-1940) . Military
academies, enlisted conscription, and better pay and
privileges also began. The military continued its strong
links with a defined group in society; first to the elite
traditional leadership, and then the rising middle class
as commonweal
.
83 Intuition is an awareness of a particular state.
Concepts are applicable models that give form to intuition.
Intuitions are sensed, while concepts are mentally
constructed. Together intuition and concepts create
knowledge. Leslie Stevenson, The Metaphysics of
Experience
.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 1-5.
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(from which its own ranks were recruited). 84 Politics
continued to be zero sum and the benefits exclusively-
defined. The models the military established to deal with
this reality can be placed generally under the category of
the arbitrator role. The constant shock and evolution to
the military common identity left only "La Patria" and a
rallying point, not any specific institutions (such as
constitutional democracy) in society. The momentum of
evolution continued because of the lack of anchors within
the common identity.
By the post World War Two era, the military in Latin
America was beginning to develop a categorical obligation
concept. Hypothetical imperatives still motivated
intervention at this point (invited by a group in society,
and/or to keep politics from intervening in the military)
.
The traditional legitimacy for intervention required a
relationship between society (or at least part of society)
and the military that involved a limitation of power
84 Reference works on the development of Latin
American militaries include: Cesar Caviedes, The Southern
Cone
. (Totowa, NJ: Rowan and Allenheld Publishers, 1984)
;
Christopher Clapham and George Philip, ed.
,
The Political
Dilemmas of Military Regimes
.
(Totowa, NJ: Barnes and
Noble Books, 1985); Samuel P. Huntington, ed. , Changing
Patterns of Military Politics
.
(New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, Inc., 1962); Jose Luis De Imaz, Los Que Mandan .
trans. Carlos A Astiz, (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1963) ; John J. Johnson, The Military and
Society in Latin America
. (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1979) ; Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics.





(limited by time or application). The traditional
limitation of power was overcome by the crucial issues the
military now perceived. The synthesis of an evolutionary
common identity, the traditional role as umpire, referee,
and judge of the various factions in society, and dedica-
tion and perceived threats to "La Patria," culminated in
the development of a categorical obligation to alter
events in society, not just react to them. As Stepan,
Clapham, Nordlinger, and others point out, the Higher War
Colleges in these countries were a breeding ground for this
ideology. In Brazil for example, of the planners of the
1964 coup, 60% had attended the Superior War College and
only 15% who had not attended were active in the plan-
ning. 85 As general views of reality were developed from
this ideology, such as operational geopolitics and national
security doctrine, and society continued in disarray, the
hypothetical imperative came in line with the categorical
imperative and a common identity was born in obligational
legitimacy.
F. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY MAINTENANCE
Maintenance of obligational legitimacy is crucial for
continued rule of the military ruler-type regime. Although
most in the military organization are not completely aware
85 Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, Military





of the existence of obligational legitimacy, they are aware
of its manifestations (such as national security doctrine)
and the importance to continually nurture a firm unity.
This is accomplished through continued inculcation of the
present members of the military, socialization of new
members to the organization, and protection from a
breakdown in unity. Many programs and policies devised
toward the end of these three areas of interest are already
in existence when the military enters government. Any
professional military has various programs established to
foster unity, comradery, discipline and esprit d 1 corps.
Maintenance of obligational legitimacy simply becomes
another item on the agenda, or becomes the driving force
behind the agenda in an already established program. 86
Whatever the case, an increased awareness for the need to
maintain internal unity marked the new ruler-type regimes
from the more traditional arbitrator regimes.
Obligational legitimacy inculcation of the members of
the military takes place within both the ruling elite and
the apparatus. This is a key element as David Easton
points out, The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is
probably the single most effective device for regulating
86 iiF0r example, in the 1956 curriculum of the ECEME,
there were no lectures given on counterguerrilla warfare,
internal security, or Communism. ... By 1968, the curriculum
contained 222 hours on internal security, 129 hours on
irregular warfare, and only 21 hours on the classical
professional topics of territorial defense." Stepan, The
Military in Politics , p. 181.
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the flow of diffuse support in favor of both authorities
and of the regime." 87 Within the ruling elite an effort
must be made to manage the evolution of the common identity
so as to keep control of military coherence of action.
Brazil, for example, attempted to partially accomplish this
through active E.S.G. alumni associations and news-
letters. 88 Also, new ideas must be either co-opted or
absorbed within the ruling elite. Sometimes this is not
possible, such as in Chile where 48 generals were forced to
retire for diverging views. 89 Within the military
apparatus obligational inculcation is exercised through
such avenues as training, selective promotions, and expres-
sive symbols (including special encampments, elite
insignia, symbols of power, and social prestige)
.
Socialization of new members to the military apparatus
or the ruling elite is another maintenance function.
87 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political
Life , (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 278.
88 Stepan, The Military in Politics , pp. 177-178.
89 Numerous moderate officers were retired ahead of
schedule. By 1975, 11 generals, headed by Arellano Stark,
Commander of the Santiago Garrison, had to go after
petitioning Pinochet to end his economic policies. By
1976, 29 generals had gone into force retirement since
September of 1973. In July of 1978, General Gustavo Leigh,
Commander of the Air Force and junta member, was discharged
for "repeatedly violating the principles which inspired the
1973 military movement." 18 Air Force were shortly
thereafter retired. Hernan Rosenkranz , "The Church in
Chilean Politics: The Confusing Years," In Chile After
1973: Elements for the Analysis of Military Rule , ed.
,
David E. Hojman, (Liverpool: Center for Latin American
Studies, University of Liverpool, 1985), p. 78.
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Again, training and special schools play an important role
for the new recruit to the general officers. Recruitment
in the officer corp is almost exclusively from the middle
class and begins at a very early age. 90 Communal homo-
geneity and exclusiveness strengthens the "melting pot"
environment at the military academies and in regular units.
The military bureaucracy, organizational culture and
mission orientation are also important in establishing
norms and acceptable behavior within the military common
identity.
Inculcation and socialization are preventative measures
and leave off where protection from the breakdown of
military unity begins. Numerous measures are taken by a
ruler regime to regulate the demands on the military. This
is one reason for the more closed system of the ruler
regime over past types of military rule. 91 Feedback from
society is kept to a minimum by keeping the available
avenues for communication small and rigidly regulated, such
as the news media and public gatherings. Military regime
responses to the demands of society include government by
decree, such as Brazil's Institutional Acts and Chile's
90 In Brazil for example, almost all cadets at the
military academy attended a military high school. About
90% of Brazilian officers thus began military education at
about 12 years of age. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics,
Military Coups and Governments
,
p . 6 1
.
91 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics. Military Coups
and Governments , p. 122.
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Declaration of Principles in 1974. Postponement of
benefits, partial satisfaction of demands, time lags,
compromise, displays of goodwill, and of course coercion
are all options open to the military to protect their own
unity from the stresses of governing. Bending toward the
hypothetical imperative (i.e. displaying accomplishment,
mission success, and development) , from where most of the
officer corps perceives their obligation to rule, and not
down playing the nonmoral reasons for maintaining rule
(outlined in Chapter 3) , also aid indirectly in supporting
military unity and thus obligational legitimacy.
G. OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY BREAKDOWN
Despite the best efforts of military regimes, the
causal conditions influencing obligational legitimacy
breakdown are too many and too complex to manage in-
definitely. The threshold of support for the regime,
maintained mostly by the hypothetical obligation, is not
all or nothing, but a margin with room for give and take.
Therefore, initiation of transition (dissolution of an
authoritarian regime) is a difficult point to precisely
mark. In general though, once that part of the military's
irreducible common identity, termed here obligational
legitimacy, breaks down, the transition of the military
regime from power begins. This study postulates that there
is no other way for the transition to begin. Figure 5
81
demonstrates this thesis. A breakdown in the monopoly of
coercive power through civil war, revolution, or social
upheaval is not a transition. 92 With a monopoly of
coercive power and a common identity to use that power if













This breakdown is also important because it is much easier
to empirically observe than actual transition initiation.
In general, two processes can lead to obligational
legitimacy breakdown, inability to correctly regulate the
stresses placed on the regime by society and internal
cleavage of the military organization. In other words,
92 See footnote 8 for definitions of transition and revolution.
both of these processes will ultimately lead to divergence
of the hypothetical and categorical contexts of the
military's obligation to rule. Failure to regulate the
stresses of rule include letting the demands of society
permeate the military organization, or completely
alienating society so as to cause a complete shutdown of
the country's productive capabilities, which would after a
time hamper the military's ability to run the government.
The latter situation could cause a coercive response from
the military, which may or may not stimulate a response
from society, but in it would communicate a message to the
military organization no matter how impermeable they were
to any other stresses.
Internal cleavage to the point of serious fraction-
alization will also cause a divergence of the hypothetical
and categorical views of military obligation to rule. 93
Internal cleavage in the military is always present at some
level, and different military organizations are able to
tolerate higher levels than others, but at some level in
all ruler-type military organizations, a definite break
occurs. This can be observed by such events as abnormal
levels of internal strife, retirements, diverging or
crossed policy signals, a regime search for new missions
and/or success, and succession problems within the regime.
Points of divergence include such situations as inability
93 See Chapter 5, for a full discussion of fractionalization.
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of the regime to accomplish the demands of the hypothetical
obligation or exhaustion (failure of mission success)
,
wrong responses on the part of the regime perceived by the
military apparatus (mission orientation change) , and
perceived loss of professionalism by parts of the military
(permeable mission orientation and organizational cul-
ture). 94
H. OBLIGATTONAL LEGITIMACY IN THE POST TRANSITION PHASE
Even in this era of liberalization and fledgling
democracies, the return of ruler-type military regimes is
an important concern. In every case of transition the
military maintains a monopoly of coercive power in society.
The key element of concern must be the status and potential
for reconstitution of obligational legitimacy. Certainly
many of the same concerns the militaries had prior to
coming to power before are still present or are again on
the rise. Sendero Luminoso continues to be a serious
internal threat in Peru. Economic development is
stagnating, or groping along at best throughout the region.
Political parties are still practicing exclusionary
tactics. But these are influences of the hypothetical
obligation for military rule. What of the categorical
94 For a discussion of causal conditions and more
specifically, necessary and sufficient conditions, that
lead to obligational legitimacy breakdown, see Chapter 5.
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obligation founded in the belief of the natural superiority
of the military?
After transition, some who held the categorical belief
in the military obligation to rule must surely have altered
their opinions, as did most who rejected the hypothetical
obligation ideal. Still, it is safe to say the idea has
not completely died. Nor has the perception by those who
still cling to these ideals that they may have to return to
government, whether they want to or not. As Ortega y
Gasset suggests, The greatest danger to society is the
intervention of the state. But that is where the common
man leads it. 95 A great deal depends on the "common man"
at this point. The majority of the military in any of
these renewed democracies is watching to see how this new
liberalization process proceeds. In each country, critical
junctures are just ahead. Brazil is nearing its first
direct presidential election in over two decades and has
still to produce a new constitution. Argentina also has a
presidential election on the horizon that will test the
democratic institution because the personally popular
Alfonsin cannot constitutionally run again and the
Peronistas have gained popularity. Peru is teetering on
the brink of complete economic failure and President
Garcia, even with the support of the military, is fal-
95 Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses , pp. 88-
95.
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tering. In Uruguay, with a relatively untarnished and
unrepentant military, industrialists refuse to come to
terms with labor and the Colorados and Blancos have, thus
far, been ineffectual in influencing a solution.
Not until after these critical junctures are crossed is
there any real threat to a reconstitution of obligational
legitimacy. The Augustinian cry of the ruler-type military
regimes, "Oh Lord, give us democracy, but not yet!" is not
acceptable to society or most of the military in these
countries. Most believe they can make democracy work.
Almost all know they don't want a return to military
authoritarianism. History may not highlight what choices
to make, but it can certainly point out what to avoid.
There is the hope that the military common identity
continues to evolve, but from a strict obligation to "La
Patria" to an obligation to the institution of democracy.
^
6
In the short term, there seems to be little danger of
reconstitution of obligational legitimacy. In fact, the
real potential for obligational reconstitution lies not
with the present senior military leadership, but with those
mid level officers who embraced the categorical obligation
for military rule. The time may come when they will be the
ruling elite in their military organization and the context
96 This hope was voiced by a senior Latin American
officer who also suggested that most senior officers in his
country would revolt rather than return to government. He
said he would "pack his bags and go home," if a coup was
again seriously contemplated.
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ripe for the development of a new hypothetical obligation
which will again create a synthesis leading toward
obligational legitimacy.
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V. TRANSITION THEORY: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variable of this study's hypothesis,
obligational legitimacy, has been defined and analyzed
from various perspectives. The environment in which it
evolves, is maintained, and breaks down is made up of
influential forces both outside and inside the military
organization. Specifically of interest to this study are
the influences which cause a breakdown in obligational
legitimacy. Nine variables are presented in this chapter
and are deductively inferred to be necessary, sufficient,
or contributing for obligational legitimacy breakdown.
A. CONTEXT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
There are several contextual aspects, relevant to all
nine independent variables in this hypothesis, that are
important to understand. First, the variables together
attempt to encompass the milieu of the South American
military regime in power. These variables are intended to
be sufficiently broad to incorporate the major factors
influencing military regimes, but narrow enough to maintain
causal integrity (i.e. not just become nebulous "catch-all"
categories) . In this attempt to include all relevant
causal factors affecting obligational legitimacy, some
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overlap occurs. As discussed in Chapter 2, the variables
have been rigorously separated for methodological purposes.
In real life, though, these variables may be intricately
intertwined and interrelated, often times seemingly acting
concomitantly or synergistically. Because of these
realities, overlap of components within the causal
conditions is unavoidable (e.g. one form of "international
influence" may come in the form of trade barriers, yet this
would also be relevant to the "economics" causal condi-
tion) . To establish a workable level of complexity, causal
components will generally be considered in the causal
condition where they exerted the most influence positively
or negatively on obligational legitimacy.
The second important aspect of the independent
variables offered is, they are each listed as potential
causal conditions in neutral form (i.e. not high, low,
strong, weak, etc.). This is because each causal condition
could have a positive or negative affect on obligational
legitimacy. "Political capital," for example, could be
high and thus supportive of obligational legitimacy,
whereas if it was very low, this may aid in obligational
legitimacy breakdown. In the final analysis, though, it is
the positive or negative condition that moves obligational
legitimacy toward breakdown that is important to this
study, especially those conditions that are deemed
necessary or sufficient.
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A third important point embodied within these nine
independent variables is the insistence that they represent
actual causes, not symptoms. In other words, some studies
attempt to explain events by the manifested correlations
that accompany transitions. Often times these correlations
are really only side effects, 97 indirect causes, 98 or
reasons99 . Simply using words like "because," "reason,"
97 A side effect is a peripheral or secondary result,
not a cause itself. An example of this is the rise of
political parties which is often misinterpreted as a causal
factor in the move toward transition. Representative works
in this category are offered by, Charles G. Gillespie,
"Review Essay: From Authoritarian Crisis to Democratic
Transitions," Latin American Research Review . (June 6,
1986)
, pp. 1-30.
98 An indirect cause is an influence that is separated
in the causal chain from the result by a more exact root
cause. An illustrative example of an indirect cause being
mistaken for a root cause is that joining the Mormon Church
(which prohibits smoking) will lessen the chances of
contracting lung cancer. The actual empirical cause is the
act of stopping smoking. An example relevant to this topic
is, transition in Uruguay took place because the military
regime there chose to follow Chile's example and hold a
constitutional plebescite, and had unexpected results.
This theory offered by, Luis E. Gonzalez, "Uruguay, 1980-
1981: An Unexpected Opening," Latin American Research
Review . No. 3 1983, pp. 72-73. The Obligational Legitimacy
Hypothesis suggests the actual causes may have had more to
do with permeable organizational culture and a realization
of the loss of external legitimacy.
99 According to Scriven, Reasoning , pp. 65-66. reasons
are misleading because they assert a causal connection, but
they don't really tell you about a premise from which you
can infer, or accept, a conclusion. Reasons only give an
explanation for an event. An illustrative example is "I
got wet because the roof is leaking." The actual cause was
the rain. A relevant example to this topic is, the
transition in Uruguay occurred because the regime chose to
leave. Offered by, Enriquie A. Baloyra, "Democratic
Transition in Comparative Perspective." In Comparing New
Democracies, Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean
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"therefore," and "if . . . then. . . " does not guarantee a direct
causal condition. Applicability to each unique country is
not sacrificed, though, in this rigid approach to causal-
ity. This model attempts to maintain a sensitivity to
local factors such as Brazil's tradition of "jeito," 100 or
the impact of the Malvinas/Falklands War on the Argentine
military regime.
The fourth and final aspect that needs to be understood
before we expand each variable, is the individual environ-
ment each variable originates from and operates in. The
first variable, "international influence," by definition
originates outside the military regime's country and
operates on both the international level and the national
level within that country. "Economic forces," "external
legitimacy," and "political capital" all originate and
operate on both the international and national levels.
Although every country has a political culture, in this
model "political culture" will only deal with the country
under consideration. The political cultures of other
countries are indirect causal variables incorporated in
"international influence." "Organizational culture,"
"degree of fractionalization, " "mission orientation," and
Europe and the Southern Cone , (Boulder: Westview Press,
1987), ed. Enrique A. Baloyra. p. 43. What Baloyra says may
be true, but the reason is void of any causal connection.
100 Jeito is defined as a gimmick or knack for
getting around problems or obstacles to get something done.
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"mission success" are contained within the context of the
military itself.
B. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
1. International Influence
"International influence" is defined here as
direct or indirect power from a source or sources external
to a given state, to sway or affect a course of action.
This variable is perhaps the most complex. It includes
factors such as political and military threats, actions and
supports; and the phenomena of contagion. Indirect
elements which are incorporated in the above affects
include technology, inventions, international events, and
ideas. These various forces are grouped together under the
term international influence because rarely do they appear
alone. Most international influences act in concert with
each other, or against each other. Actors who exercise
international influence include nation states, quasi
governmental bodies of these states (e.g. U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) , international organizations (e.g. United
Nations, Catholic Church, Socialist International),
multinational corporations (e.g. International Telephone
and Telegraph, Standard Oil) , intraregional organizations
(e.g. Contadora Advisory Group, RIO Treaty members),
interest/pressure groups (e.g. Amnesty International, The
Grange) , and supranationals (e.g. International Monetary
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Fund, World Bank)
. The superpowers and regional actors
play an especially important role because they can directly
affect a country due to power and/or proximity, and can
indirectly influence through applying pressure to the other
bodies mentioned. These actors may attempt to apply
leverage in areas such as trade, finance, aid, military
training, technology transfer, political recognition, and
military threat. Each actor has a unique agenda it
attempts to support, which defines how these elements of
leverage are applied.
The United States has and continues to play a
pivotally influential role in Latin America, economically,
politically and in terms of regional security. Lars
Schoultz correctly suggests that the general objectives of
the United States in Latin America revolve around the
concept of stability. Instability has been seen as a
threat to security, free market capitalism, and as an
exploitable opportunity to our political and ideological
enemies. 101 This fear of instability and the ensuing
insecurity has led to contradictions (e.g. the United
States, one of the most open societies in the world
supporting authoritarian dictatorships, human rights, and
democratization; all in the same decade), further
101 Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States
Policy Toward Latin America , (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1987), pp. 11-67.
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complicating any attempt to clarify the role of
international influence. 102
Through indirect incidental factors, the United
States does support the maintenance of military regimes.
By way of the Monroe Doctrine and its present interpreta-
tion, Latin America is protected from the Soviet nuclear
threat and foreign military intervention. 103 The Malvinas
War being an aberration to the rule, Latin American
militaries have not had to concern themselves with armed
threats from outside the hemisphere. Even within the
hemisphere the threat of attack is very low. Skeptics of
this idea might point to O'Donnell and Schmitter who
highlight the fact that, "the most frequent [worldwide]
context within which a transition from authoritarian rule
has begun in recent decades has been military defeat in an
armed conflict." 104 Not only is this not the typical case
in Latin America with only one case (Argentina) out of six
cases of recent transitions, but short of complete
102 The contradiction in U.S. policy stems not from
wavering human rights policy, although that should also be
cause for alarm. Rather, the administration has condemned
the use of repression/violations of human rights while
simultaneously supporting an economic (and social) project
which seemingly demands an authoritarian umbrella and is
also specifically designed to disarticulate, demobilize,
and otherwise ensure the total subordination of large
segments of the populace to the regime.
103 Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin
America , pp. 143-144.
104 O'Donnell and Schmitter, "Opening Authoritarian
Regimes," Transitions from Authoritarian Rule , pp. 17-18.
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destruction of the military, obligational legitimacy could
seemingly remain in tact. Even in such cases, the regime
still holds the physical (i.e. coercive) power to control.
The lack of a threat leads to structural underemployment
(discussed in Chapter 3, section D as supporting military
regimes) and the potential alienation of the military in
civil society. Without a meaningful role in society,
Barros and Coelho maintain that military's reference group
will shift from societal groups to professional ones across
national lines. 10 ^ This seemingly tends to support the
concept of obligational legitimacy which itself
disassociates the military from society. In theory then,
international actors have the potential ability to sway or
affect a military regime and more specifically, the
military organization's obligational legitimacy.
The other international influence offered here,
contagion, although not intentionally applied by an
international actor, also seems to play an important role
in the breakdown of obligational legitimacy. If Barros and
Coelho are correct in their alienation theory, an increased
sensitivity and awareness of the successes, failures, and
ideas of other military regimes would be forth coming.
Certainly a cursory review of the facts seems to indicate
the important effect of contagion. Uruguay, for example,
105 Barros and Coelho, "Military Intervention and
Withdrawal," Armies and Politics in Latin America , p. 443.
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followed Chile's example in presenting the opportunity of a
plebescite to the country (although the results were much
different) . Also, it is unlikely that it is just coin-
cidence in a five year period Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and
Uruguay transitioned from military rule. Of course this
does not necessarily mean that contagion is the cause, but
international influence of this type cannot be ignored
either. In an early study (1978) of this effect on ruler
regimes by Edward Constantine, the conclusion is, "the
evidence is stronger for those turnovers that occurred in
connection with the Great Depression and during the last
half of the 1940s and 1950s; the contagion effect does not
appear to have been as influential during the remaining
decades." 106
The process by which international influence
reaches and affects the military regime's obligational
legitimacy varies with each country. For example, Enrique
Baloyra points out,
United States participation in these processes has varied
with geographic area and the traditional political role
of the U.S. in it, with the size and external linkages of
the country in question. Accordingly, the United States
has been more involved in Central America and the
Caribbean. . . . With the exception of the Argentine case,
one finds nothing in South America comparable to the U.S.
role in the Philippine process of transition of 1984-1986
106 Edward Lewis Constantine, Jr. , "A Theory of
Withdrawal of Military Governments in Latin America,"
(Thesis presented to the Graduate Council of the University
of Florida, 1978), p. 94.
96
and in orchestrating the 1986 coup against Jean
Duvalier in Haiti. 10 '
Claude
Therefore, according to each international actor's agenda,
the amount of influence directed at a regime will vary.
Also, each regime will vary in its resistance and resil-
ience to specific influence. Again, as Baloyra points out,
"During the 1980s, the United States adopted a more
activist role in Paraguay and Chile. This was a welcome
but hardly a sufficient change to determine the eventual
breakdown of those regimes." 108
The preceding discussion has highlighted the
importance of international influence, but key to this
model are the issues of necessity and sufficiency. We find
that negative international influence is often present with
obligational legitimacy breakdown. Combining deductive
inference with the discussion of obligational legitimacy
breakdown (Chapter 4, section G) , we find it could also be
absent and still have obligational legitimacy breakdown,
precluding it from being a necessary condition. Interna-
tional influence is also not a sufficient condition because
it could be present in cases of no obligational legitimacy
breakdown. Since this variable is postulated as neither
necessary or sufficient, there is no need to apply the
107 Baloyra, "Conclusion: Toward a Framework For the
Study of Democratic Consolidation," In Comparing New
Democracies, Transition and Consolidation in Mediterranean
Europe and the Southern Cone , pp. 297-298.
108 Ibid. p. 298.
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Joint Method of Agreement and Differences. As with all the
independent variables, this classification remains to be
tested.
2 . Economic Forces
"Economic forces" is defined as, inducement, or
compulsion of and by a country's efforts to produce,
develop and manage its material wealth in order to affect a
course of action. Economic forces include issues sur-
rounding national policies concerning trade, exchange
rates, foreign investment, technology, industry, agricul-
ture, and monetary, fiscal, and financial plans. Some of
the more important issues are long term boom/bust cycles,
market volatility, inflation, capital flight, national
perceptions and application of economic theory (ranging
from the orthodox policies of Chile's "Chicago Boys" and
Argentina's Martinez de Hoz to the heterodox policies of
Peru) , development through import substitution industrial-
ization, regional economic integration, capital vs. labor
intensive industrialization, agricultural reform, and
infrastructure improvement.
Economics, perhaps more than any other causal
variable, has been pointed to as a major force in military
transitions to and from power. 109 In fact, Gordan Richards
109 Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and
Bureaucratic—Authoritarianism: Studies in South American
Politics
.
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies,
University of California, 1973) ; and Edward C. Epstein,
"Legitimacy, Institutionalization, and Opposition in
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forwards the theory that the most recent wave of military
regime collapses was caused primarily by the external debt
crisis that emerged in the early 1980s. He states, "The
breakdown of military authoritarianism in Latin America is
inextricably linked to the openness of these economies and
the international shocks to which they were
subjected..." 110 Related to this issue is Chalmers' and
Robinson's structural change argument. They suggest
important international and national actors (which
presumedly includes the military) have come to believe
certain basic economic circumstances have altered the
utility of military regimes in favor of more liberal
procedures. Chalmers and Robinson, in speaking of the
economic decisions facing any government explain,
Liberal regimes become rational choices when the issues
facing a country are diffuse and complex, requiring
procedures for identifying problems, clarifying goals,
and ordering priorities. Authoritarian regimes become
more likely when some process has focused the agenda on a
small range of crucial, basic issues and the major task
Exclusionary Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes: The
Situation of the 1980s," Comparative Politics . October
1984, pp. 37-54. highlight the importance of economics in
militaries coming to power. Gordon Richards,
"Stabilization Crises and the Breakdown of Military
Authoritarianism in Latin America," Comparative Political
Studies , 4 January 1986, pp. 449-485. and Jonathan Hartlyn
and Samuel A. Morley, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
in Comparative Perspective," Latin American Political
Economy , ed. Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel A. Morley,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 38-53. highlight the
importance of economics in military transitions from power.
110 Richards, "Stabilization Crises and the Breakdown
of Military Authoritarianism in Latin America," Comparative
Political Studies , p. 481.
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concerns mobilizing energies and ensuring forceful
implementation. 11]-
This concept assumes that a broader group (i.e. more than
just the military) makes the decision to leave power.
Juxtaposed against this concept is the Obligational
Legitimacy Hypothesis which suggests that although other
groups in society may make choices, the final decision to
leave power belongs to the military alone.
The choices made by groups in society other than
the military are important to consider though. It is
within the context of the variable that society (both
international and national) has a great influence.
National society can intentionally send messages to a
regime through strikes, work slowdowns, and low
productivity. National society can also incidentally
influences a regime through such avenues as capital flight
and accelerating inflation. International society can also
intentionally influence military regimes through tariffs,
trade barriers, special trade incentives, aid, and loans.
Particularly notable are incidental economic forces, such
as the exogenous shocks to the world economy experienced in
the 1970s and 1980s with the OPEC embargoes, the rise in
interest rates, and falling prices for petroleum, which any
type of government has difficulty dealing with. How a
111 Chalmers and Robinson, "Why Power Contenders
Choose Liberalization," In Armies and Politics of Latin
America, p. 409.
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military government perceives and reacts to all these
forces is open to debate. Richards suggests that "military
regimes were usually better able to enforce fiscal
restraint, and the breakdown of dictatorships had more to
do with exogenous shocks to the economy." 112 On the other
hand, exogenous shocks are not votes of confidence or
nonconfidence in the regime, as capital flight and work
slow downs could be considered. Exogenous shocks would
presumedly not effect obligational legitimacy as much
because there is no control over them. As with "interna-
tional influence," it seems how the military perceives and
accepts or rejects these messages that become the critical
criteria.
Again, as with "international influence," the per-
vasiveness of this variable in most military transitions
makes it difficult to confirm necessity and sufficiency.
Although serious negative economic forces are present in
most cases of military transition, deductive inference
suggests the possibility exists that transition could occur
without these negative forces. Similarly, it is postulated
that negative economic forces is not a sufficient condition
for obligational legitimacy breakdown because very serious
economic problems could be present in a specific country,
112 Richards, "Stabilization Crises and the Breakdown
of Military Authoritarianism in Latin America," Comparative
Political Studies , p. 453.
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but obligational legitimacy could remain intact, precluding
a transition from power.
3 . External Legitimacy
"External legitimacy" is defined as "The quality a
political system has of being viewed by the people as just,
and proper, and which converts political power into
rightful authority." 113 Inherent in this definition is the
need for social agreement between the rulers and the ruled,
and a collective identity rather than coercive power (as in
obligational legitimacy) supporting the right to rule. Any
type of legitimacy continues as long as a common identity
exists. Just as with obligational legitimacy, the common
identity has a foundation of metaphysical values, norms
that define a general view of reality, and expressive
symbols that mobilize the population in a general direc-
tion. The important point here is, the common identity
encompasses all society, not just the military organiza-
tion. Jean-Jacques Rousseau clarifies this more generally
accepted concept of legitimacy and places it in direct
opposition with obligational legitimacy when he explains,
"The strongest—unless he transforms force into right and
obedience into duty— is never strong enough to have his way
113 Rossi and Piano, The Latin American Political
Dictionary , p. 69.
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all the time. . . .Might does not make right. . . .We are
obligated to obey only such powers as are legitimate." 114
Latin American military regimes see themselves as
legitimate (through obligational legitimacy) , but do not
expect all of society to understand their "higher call." 115
Society at worst rejects this claim to rule completely, or
at best, accepts it as authority only (i.e. top down
justification, not bottom up acceptance116 ) . These
authoritarian regimes must, therefore, either accept this
as a variable to contend with, or transition into a
totalitarian type regime (which, according to Linz
'
definition would, among other features, require society to
mobilize behind an exclusive ideology supporting the
rulers 117 ). History demonstrates the unlikelihood and
114 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract ,
trans. Willmore Kendall, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954), p. 56.
115 For explanation of this belief, see Chapter 4.
116
"Legitimacy differs from authority in that
authority means the justified right to rule, while
legitimacy refers to the nonleader's acceptance of these
justifications (reasons) as meaningful and plausible. In
other words, while authority involves one set of leaders
justifying their rule over other persons, legitimacy
proceeds not from the top downward but from the bottom
upward; the nonleader's consent to the justifications
proclaimed by the leaders." Andrain, Political Life and
Social Chancre , p. 150.
117 Juan J. Linz, "A Typology of Authoritarian
Regimes," paper presented at the American Political
Science Association, Washington, D.C., 5-9 September
1972., p. 13.
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difficulty of such a transition, 118 and so these regimes
must learn to deal with "external legitimacy" as an
important factor in their continued stable rule. 119
The process by which external legitimacy
influences the military regime is best understood in terms
of the political system components, which Andrain suggests
are the "objects of legitimacy. These objects are: 1)
political structures, 2) beliefs (both values and norms)
,
3) rule by certain individuals, and 4) particular
policies. 120 How the military perceives and reacts to
their external legitimacy (or illegitimacy) will vary with
each of these components, because each is a source of
external legitimacy. For example, Brazil's military
government evidently felt it important to leave the
country's Congress open during their rule, while Argentina
felt it prudent to close theirs. Also, as specific public
opinions become public demands through one of these
component conduits, the military regime seemingly attempts
to maintain its course and achieve its goals through one of
118 See Chapter 7, section C for an explanation of
transitions from authoritarian to totalitarian regime systems.
119 Legitimacy stabilizes the connection between
means and ends. David Easton explains, "...a system may
rely on persuasion, appeals of self-interest, traditions,
coercion to attain goals, rally energies—to obtain
acceptance or acquiescence in outputs and structures
through which they are produced." David Easton, A Systems




120 Ibid. p. 150.
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the other components of the political system. For example,
the Brazilian military government's particular economic
policies helped produce the Brazilian economic miracle.
Success with this particular policy also, to some degree,
let the regime neglect the "beliefs category" (during the
Medici era of the Fifth Institutional Act, etc.) which
severely impinged values and norms surrounding the concepts
of liberty and equality.
As military regimes attempt to efficiently
maintain stability through the use of external legitimacy,
they pass through various phases of authority which are
best defined in terms of external legitimacy. Guglielmo
Ferrero categorizes four types of authority: prelegi-
timate, legitimate, illegitimate, and postlegitimate.
Prelegitimate authority is characterized by rulers
believing in their justification for rule, but the ruled do
not. When both the rulers and the ruled accept the ruler's
justifications, authority is legitimate. When neither the
rulers nor the ruled accept a justification for rule,
authority is illegitimate. Finally, when the ruler's old
justification for rule becomes outmoded and new justifica-
tions become accepted by the ruled, authority is post-
legitimate. 121 These concepts are very helpful in tracking
121 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life ,
pp. 151-152. which paraphrased thoughts from Guglielmo
Ferrero, The Principles of Power , trans. Theodore R.
Jaeckel, (New York: Putnam, 1942), pp. 140-302.
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the actions of a given military regime and therefore the
possible influence this variable has on obligational
legitimacy because not every decision made by every member
of the military is made for purely machiavellian reasons.
An important conclusion of the discussion thus far
is, external legitimacy is tied closely to "international
influence" and "economic forces." How the military regime
reacts to these other causal conditions (how they exercise
power) and what they produce (performance) will affect
external legitimacy. Military regimes may come to power by
popular demand (though not by elections) . As Linz similarly
suggests for democratic regime legitimacy, at some point
military regimes may claim at least a limited external
legitimacy because of society's "belief that in spite of
shortcomings and failures, the existing political institu-
tions are better than any others that might be
established...." 122 Sometime before a transition occurs,
though, they become solely a de facto government. At that
point, their external legitimacy rests on how well and for
whom they perform. In other words, this variable focusses
on how political actions get some groups the tangible
things they want from government and at the same time,
weigh what these same actions mean to the mass public.
When these self-imposed governments begin to become
122 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
Crisis. Breakdown & Reequilibration
.
(Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 16.
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transparent in serving a special interest group and not
civil society in general, they must rely more and more on
coercion, which further reduces their claim on external
legitimacy.
Even though a military regime does concern itself
with external legitimacy, this model postulates that it is
obligational legitimacy that ultimately justifies, in the
military's mind, their right (and moral obligation) to
rule. Therefore, external legitimacy may decrease without
seriously affecting obligational legitimacy, especially if
the military doesn't have to increase coercion to continue
the status quo. Through this logic external legitimacy is
postulated not to be a sufficient condition. Low external
legitimacy does not guarantee obligational legitimacy
breakdown, but deductive inference suggests that high
external legitimacy would preclude obligational legitimacy
breakdown. In other words, low external legitimacy is a
necessary condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown.
4 . Political Capital
"Political capital" is defined as the material and
psychosocial resources available to a government to
sustain its functioning. This variable is an important
determinant of power, even for a military regime with
great coercive capabilities. Military regimes, like all
regimes, require personnel, money, customers, and a
variety of technological and material inputs in order to
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continue to function. Ruler-type military regimes are
especially sensitive to political capital because of the
secondary emphasis placed on external legitimacy. Other
types of military regimes, such as arbitrator type regimes,
either place a more important emphasis on external
legitimacy (in which case political capital would probably
not be low while external legitimacy was high—with certain
sectors of society) , or they are in power for a short
period of time (therefore not having to worry as much about
their future capabilities to function as government)
.
Since resources, for a large part, determine political
activities, authoritarian ruler regimes must rely on
societies support, or acquiescence, through means other
than ideological support.
The process by which political capital is lost or
increased highlights the means military regimes use to
maintain a functioning capability and how obligational
legitimacy is possibly affected. Loss of political
capital (what Aaron Wildavsky calls political costs)
refers to "loss of esteem and effectiveness with other
participants in the political system, and the loss of
ability to secure policies other than the one immediately
under consideration." 123 Political capital increases with
gains in esteem, effectiveness, and resources that the
123 Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
Process , (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984), p. 158.
108
regime can use in other situations. For a military regime
to run a diverse and complex government, political capital
is essential. The regime does have resources at its
disposal to increase political capital such as money,
prestige, rewards and sanctions, and expertise to deal with
uncertainty. The regime also may claim the right to make
important fiscal decisions as to what is produced and how
much; as well as how it is distributed to whom and how much
of the production will be allocated to further production,
development and consumption. Yet, Wildavsky points out,
"Resources like patronage are strictly limited and use in
one case prohibits use in another once the appointment has
been made." 124 Also, the regime must in the end still rely
on society to accomplish the actual production and
distribution.
Loss of effective political capital, for whatever
reason, severely limits the military regime's effec-
tiveness, even with coercion. Inability to govern, due to
this loss, will affect obligational legitimacy because the
military does not simply have an obligation, but an
obligation to do something . Therefore, if political
capital were very low or nonexistent, obligational
legitimacy breakdown would follow, making this variable a
sufficient causal condition. It is not a necessary
condition though, because a military regime could lose
124 Ibid., p. 159.
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"Political culture" is defined as, "the system of
attitudes, values, and beliefs by which a people under-
stand, evaluate, and respond to the institutions, policies,
and leaders of their society." 125 General components of
this variable include foundation metaphysical values, a
general view of reality, expectations of what a government
can, should and shouldn't do, appropriate reactions to a
government's actions, and an on going socialization process
to continue the established status quo of values, norms,
etc.. Specific examples (or gross generalization,
depending on your outlook) within these components include,
the Catholic ethos, caudiaje, machismo, acquiescence to
militarism, patronism, clientelism, particularism, elitism,
and personal ism. It is still an open debate as to how much
each of these actually applies, but a military regime's
accurate perception of this variable, its applicable
components and its alterations over time and the specific
context it is being applied to are critical for goal
achievement, political capital accumulation, and external
legitimacy growth. A correct understanding of political
culture by the military regime may also aid in shaping a
125 Rossi and Piano, The Latin American Political
Dictionary , p. 75.
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more effective mission orientation and establishing valid
measurements of mission success.
The process by which political culture is related
to the military regime must be understood in terms of the
components described above. Because elements in the same
society can have varying values, norms, etc. the military
must carefully consider each component. Rossi and Piano
offer an excellent list of considerations a military regime
(or any government) should take into account when weighing
the causal influence of this variable. These include, 1)
whether the people of the state identify with national
groups, parochial groups, social groups, etc. ; 2) what is
each group's belief relating to the regime's legitimacy,
efficacy, and effectiveness; 3) do the people of these
groups trust or mistrust individuals and the established
political institutions; 4) do they prefer a hierarchical
system or an egalitarian one; 5) which is more important to
these groups, order or justice; 6) do these groups feel an
obligation to participate or even have interest in
government; 7) do they feel political activity is rewarding
or ineffective; and 8) are these people willing to
sacrifice for the good of the community, or are their
interests more self or family centered. 126
An important output of this independent variable
that is very relevant to this model is, political culture
126 Ibid. pp. 75-76.
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can either amplify or dilute the perceived degree (positive
or negative) of external legitimacy. If political culture
is low, that is, the political culture is acquiescent or
accepting of military rule and external legitimacy is
negative toward the regime, negative feedback to the regime
will be low. On the other hand, if political culture is
low and external legitimacy is positive toward the regime,
feedback is likely to be spuriously amplified to the
positive. If political culture is high, that is, not at
all acquiescent or accepting of military rule, and external
legitimacy is negative toward the regime, feedback is
likely to be spuriously amplified toward the negative.
Finally, if external legitimacy is positive toward the
regime and political culture is high, the positive feedback
to the regime will likely be diluted. (In any case, it
behooves the regime to take this variable into account)
.
As the foregoing paragraph alludes, political
culture can help or hinder the stability of a regime.
Paraguay's acquiescence to Stroessner's rule, due in part
to the political culture of that country, is an example of
the positive effect of political culture toward a regime.
More often, though, political culture tends to inhibit
obligational legitimacy, as Rouquie explains:
No matter how central their position in the political
system and how great their autonomy of decision-making,
the governing military are constrained by the political
culture of the dominant internal or external classes,
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whose self-interested liberalism constitutes a restraint
on the organicist tendencies of the men in uniform. 127
Tiano's empirical findings dilute the importance of this
variable though. Her studies suggest "that political
culture is not a monolithic mirror of the political
system. .
.
[but is rather] shaped by ongoing experiences and
varying patterns of exposure to political structure and
process." 128 At best, political culture is only indirectly
linked to political structure. High political culture can
be inferred to not guarantee obligational legitimacy
breakdown and therefore is not a sufficient condition. Nor
is this condition necessary, because it need not be present
at all to have obligational legitimacy breakdown. It is
an important contributing factor, especially if misinter-
preted by the military regime.
6 . Organizational Culture
"Organizational culture" is defined as the
institutionalized organizational memory bank of patterns of
authority and standard operating procedures that has taken
on the status of objective fact by those in the organiza-
tion. This variable incorporates traditions, acceptable
emotional responses, standard operating procedures, and
trust, in a corporate understanding and corporate struc-
127 Rouquie, "Demilitarization and Military-Dominated
Politics," Armies and Politics in Latin America , p. 448.
128 Susan Tiano, "Authoritarianism and Political
Culture in Argentina and Chile in the Mid— 1960s," Latin
American Research Review , (Number 1, 1986), p. 91.
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ture. Organizational culture in the context of this model
acts as a boundary and buffer to the environment external
to the military institution and therefore the military
regime. It also filters and codes events both internal and
external to the regime. This is the "complex tissue"
through which the military screens all other independent
variables in constructing or dismantling their obligational
legitimacy. Borrowing from the concepts of David Easton,
we can categorize the organizational culture of a military
regime as a "gatekeeper" which protects the regime (more
specifically, obligational legitimacy) from some of the
stresses of the political system (i.e. keeps societal wants
from becoming demands in the eyes of the regime)
.
Organizational culture provides a useful service
to the military organization, but it also is a potential
hazard because it may produce aberrations in perceptions
and actions to other causal conditions the military must
deal with. For this hypothesis, it is important to more
fully understand this variable because of the pivotal role
it plays in maintaining the regime's obligational legiti-
macy. One way to gain useful insights into a regime's
organizational culture is to explore observable indicators
of the culture such as rites, rituals, stories, and other
expressive symbols of the military organization under
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consideration. Rites, 129 for example provide valuable
tangible indications of a military's organizational culture
because they are usually conducted or developed by the
military elite for the military apparatus (which may
provide insight into the key perceptions and decisions of
the regime) . Some examples of rites are rites of passage
(e.g. military basic training) , rites of degradation (e.g.
getting many military personnel involved in interrogation
of civilians) , rites of enhancement (e.g. awards or medals
for specific acts), rites of renewal (e.g. alumni meetings
of the Superior War College) , rites of conflict reduction
(e.g. collective bargaining over resource distribution
among the services) , rites of integration (e.g. parties at
the officer's club). 130
The degree of permeability and structural rigidity
determines the level of organizational culture. The
condition of low organizational culture is when per-
meability is high and structure is flexible. High
organizational culture conditions are the inverse.
Assuming rational actors, Weberian analysis is useful in
129 Defined as, "A relatively elaborate, dramatic,
planned set of activities that combines various forms of
cultural expressions and that often has both practical and
expressive consequences." Janice M. Beyer and Harrison M.
Trice, "How an Organization's Rites Reveal its Culture,"
Organizational Dynamics , Spring 1987, p. 6.
130 partially derived from a typology of rites in
Beyer and Trice, "How an Organization's Rites Reveal its
Culture," Organizational Dynamics , p. 11.
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explaining "that limits are built in in each type of
regime and that the transformation of regimes beyond them
is a source of their delegitimation and ultimate break-
down." 131 If organizational culture is not permeable to
events or is not "liberal" in outlook, that is, charac-
terizes them in neutral or positive terms, these limits
will not be violated and obligational legitimacy will not
be damaged, thereby making this variable a necessary
condition. It is not sufficient, however, because it is
possible to have a permeable, liberal organizational
culture and high obligational legitimacy. There is a
caveat. Only in a metaphoric sense does the military
regime organization interact with the environment. People
interact with other people. People perform the filtering
and boundary functions of the organization. The degree to
which individuals are socialized into the organizational
culture and interiorize the organizational goals, etc.,
will influence obligational legitimacy.
7 . Fractional ization
"Fractionalization" is defined as the act or
process of separating into various components while still
maintaining some degree of military coherence. Complete
destruction of military coherence would not be applicable
to this model of transition, but would rather fall into the
131 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
Crisis, Breakdown. & Reequilibration
, p. 92.
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category of civil war or revolution. 132 Fractionalization
is also not to be confused with "factionalization, " which
connotes the forming of a contentious minority within a
larger group 133 and loss of military coherence. The
perception of goal incompatibility within the military
regime, due to the interaction of other independent
variables, causes fractious expansion.
Some degree of fractionalization is present in any
regime. At some point though, the regime may no longer be
able to manage its internal cleavages. This variable can
have a direct and devastating impact on obligational
legitimacy. This is because the irreducible common
identity central to obligational legitimacy is no longer
common. Fractionalization has a synergistic impact on
other independent variables such as mission orientation and
external legitimacy which in turn affect obligational
legitimacy. Fractionalization is of particular concern to
military regimes because it multiplies the difficulty of
securing compliance of the governed. Political capital is
diluted and even the military's power of coercion may be
fettered from within. For military regimes that lack
external legitimacy and have a weak organizational culture,
this variable can be especially troublesome. As Wesson and
132 See footnote 8 for delineations of "transition"
and "revolution."
133 Definition derived from The New American Heritage
Dictionary , rev. ed. (1973), s.v. "Faction."
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Fleischer explain, "Arbitrary authority invites arbitrary
rejection, and the necessity of making many political
choices is inevitably divisive." 134
Fractionalization plays a key role in the
breakdown of obligational legitimacy and thus military
transitions from power in Latin America. It is posited
that whenever a high degree of fractionalization is
present, obligational legitimacy is guaranteed to
breakdown. Therefore this variable is a sufficient
condition. It is difficult to be any more specific as to
exact levels of fractionalization required to cause
obligational legitimacy breakdown because of the numerous
differences in the militaries themselves and the indepen-
dent variables affecting them. Fractionalization is not a
necessary condition though, because it need not be present
for obligational legitimacy breakdown (e.g. the military
could decide in unison that they no longer had an obliga-
tion to rule the country)
.
8 . Mission Orientation
"Mission orientation" is defined as the military's
general view of reality and their role within that reality.
It involves the military's perceived charter within the
government and within civil society, and their commitment
to that sacred charge. This variable is closely related to
134 Robert Wesson and David V. Fleischer, Brazil in
Transition , (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 131.
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organizational culture, but whereas organizational culture
is concerned with internal corporate functioning, mission
orientation is concerned with a specific sense of duty in
relation to society on one level and actual execution of
activities and decisions on another level.
Mission orientation is the military apparatus'
ultimate measure of its obligational legitimacy to rule
(whereas the military elite's ultimate measure stems
directly from metaphysical assumptions). 135 Without
mission orientation, the military would loose sight of its
objectives and fail in its ability, internally and
externally, to rationalize continued control of government.
There are many forms of mission orientation ranging from
general concerns such as superior capacity and ability to
govern, or a "messianic self-image as the institution
ultimately interpreting and ensuring the highest interests
of the nation,..." 136 to specific goals such as economic
modernization, internal security, or political stabiliza-
tion. These concerns and goals have been absorbed into
various outlooks such as Geopolitics, and various programs
such as National Security Doctrine. What, if any,
reference groups in national or international society the
military relates to, and to what limits the regime is
135 See Chapter 4, section E for an explanation of
elites and apparatus within the military organization.
136
' Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
, p. 31.
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willing to go to accomplish its task, ties this variable
indirectly to the other independent variables. In other
words, like organizational culture, mission orientation is
a "gatekeeper" forming a protection for the military
organization and its obligational legitimacy from the
stresses of the political system. It also establishes
military operational boundaries to limit the arbitrary
power of the military members.
Mission orientation is an obvious requirement for
any military organization. This variable is an outgrowth
of the military organization's irreducible common identity,
of which obligational legitimacy is a key element. This is
not a one way system of influence. Mission orientation can
also affect obligational legitimacy. As other causal
conditions, such as economic forces, attempt to reform
mission orientation, obligational legitimacy may also be
affected, depending on the permeability and rigidity of
this variable and organizational culture. Mission
orientation change (in outlook and/or commitment) is
essential for obligational legitimacy breakdown and is
therefore a necessary condition. It is not, however, a
sufficient condition because the military could change its
mission orientation, but not have obligational legitimacy
breakdown.
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9 . Mission Success
"Mission success" is defined as achievement of the
goals and programs established by mission orientation. The
military regime must judge this variable in terms of
efficacy (capacity to find solutions) , effectiveness
(capacity to implement solutions) , and the final outcome.
Mission orientation is, by definition, the key variable
influencing mission success. This variable can affect the
obligational legitimacy of the military regime in two ways.
First, mission success is perceived as a failure (i.e.
goals are not accomplished) and obligational legitimacy
will begin to breakdown, as in the economic failures in
Argentina and Peru. Secondly, if the military regime
accomplishes mission success in certain areas, such as
elimination of an internal threat, they may find it
difficult to rationalize their continued stay in govern-
ment.
It is also important to stress the difference
between actual outcome and attitudes in mission success.
Perception of success or failure is at least as important
as actual outcomes because that is how the military will
apply it in formulating obligational legitimacy. Actual
mission success may also affect other variables which in
turn affect obligational legitimacy. Finally, outcome,
perceived or real, may only be loosely tied to organiza-
tional culture. Pfeffer explains that "This means that
121
decisions can be rationalized with little regard to the
actual specifics of the decision." 137 Although this
variable is ultimately very important, it is only a
contributing variable influencing obligational legitimacy.
It is possible to have mission success and have obliga-
tional legitimacy breakdown therefore not a necessary
condition. It is also possible to have mission failure and
have no obligational legitimacy breakdown, therefore this
is not a sufficient condition.
C. SUMMARY OF VARIABLES
The nine independent variables considered here have
each demonstrated some causal linkage with the breakdown of
obligational legitimacy and the transition process (see
Figure 6) . This thesis postulates that the severe loss of
political capital and fractionalization are sufficient
causes for obligational legitimacy breakdown. Loss of
external legitimacy, low organizational culture and mission
orientation change are put forward as necessary conditions.
To have obligational legitimacy breakdown, all three of
these necessary conditions must be present. Only when all
three are present as an equivalent condition or when
fractionalization or loss of political capital is present
is obligational legitimacy breakdown assured. This thesis
has not postulated when (in the causal chain of events) the
137 pfeffer, Power in Organizations , p. 180.
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necessary conditions will occur with a sufficient condi-
tion. They each may occur before or after frationaliza-
tion or loss of political capital. It is to the case
studies of transitions in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and
Peru, and the non transition in Chile that we must now
turn, to confirm this thesis and possibly clarify the mode
of the causal chain of events leading to obligational


























Following the logic structure presented in Chapter 2,
the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis has been con-
structed. Obligational legitimacy is influenced by the
nine independent variables discussed in the previous
chapter. By applying deductive logic to these independent
variables, this hypothesis has categorized them as
necessary, sufficient, or contributing for obligational
legitimacy breakdown. We are now ready to investigate four
transitions and a case of non transition. If this
hypothesis is correct, and obligational legitimacy does
exist, these case studies should offer inductive assurance
that the independent variables categorized as necessary and
sufficient in the previous chapter are indeed so.
A. CASE STUDIES
The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis has been
constructed to study the phenomenon of South American
transitions from military rule. The transitions this
chapter will review are Argentina 1984, Brazil 1985, Peru
1980, and Uruguay 1985. The non transition of Chile will
also be considered. This array of countries offers
interesting contrasts in evaluating the obligational
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legitimacy model because of size and complexity dif-
ferences, disparate ideologies and regime goals, and
organizational and political cultural variances.
Argentina's military, for example, did not schedule its
departure, while Peru's military did. Brazil's military
almost made an art out of the transition process.
Uruguay's "slow motion coup" regime attempted to establish
long term rule in much the same way as Chile had ac-
complished earlier, with a constitutional plebiscite. The
results varied greatly from what the regime had expected
though. Applying this theory to Chile will test the
efficacy in explaining why some military regimes have not
yet transitioned from power. Through an analysis of these
five countries (as opposed to an in depth investigation of
one or two countries) the necessity and/or sufficiency of
the Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis 's causal conditions
will be tested.
B. ARGENTINA 1976-1984 138
The Peronista government elected in 1973 brought the
country to complete chaos by 1976. This gave the military
a second chance at bureaucratic authoritarianism. Unlike
I-* 8 Sources for this section include, Guillermo
O'Donnell, The Bureaucratic Authoritarian State , (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983) ; Robert Potash, The
Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Peron to
Frondizi , (Stanford, CA. : Stanford University Press, 1979);
Gary W. Wynia, Argentina, Illusions & Reality , (New York:
Holmes & Meier, 1986)
.
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the failed Ongania regime (1966-1970) , the Videla regime
had much more aggressive and detailed plans. The day after
taking control of the government, the military presented to
the country The Act of National Reorganization which
initiated what became known as the "Proceso." The military
committed themselves to an ambitious agenda which included
restoration of national security (external and internal)
,
economic efficiency, moral values, and authentic represen-
tative democracy, but with no schedule for completion.
Their specific goals included stabilizing civil and
political society through exclusion of the Peronistas and
elimination of the Marxist People's Revolutionary Army
(ERP)
,
the Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas or Montoneros, and
the other smaller leftist factions such as FAL and FAR.
The regime also planned to improve the economy through
revitalization and reduction of the private sector and,
most importantly, control of inflation and competitive
growth. Finally, the regime planned to reeducate the
country to correct standards of morality and uprightness.
Mission orientation began to drift due to both success
and failure in attaining the regime's goals. In 1979
President Videla claimed victory in the "dirty war" which
left the regime in a quandary as to its full purpose, as
Videla manifests in his statement, "We have won the war,
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and now we must win the peace." 139 Through a ruthless anti
terrorist campaign, the threat of leftist subversives all
but disappeared, as did an estimated 15,000 to 20,000
people. The economic stabilization plan, under the
guidance of Jose A. Martinez de Hoz, registered a 7.3
percent growth rate by 1979 and capital flight had been
reversed. However, in March of 1980, economic failure
caught the country by surprise with the failure of four
major banks. This failure touched off financial panic.
Capital flight, bankruptcies, and the foreign debt grew at
record levels as inflation topped 100% again in 1981
(capping a 30 year rise of 24 million percent 140 ) . The
public sector continued to expand and the external OPEC and
debt shocks left little stability in the economy.
Confidence in the government of Videla and his successor,
General Viola, disappeared. In public, the military
hierarchy maintained a face of reckless confidence and
unity in their ability to control the situation. As late
as June of 1982, General Jose Miret, Secretary of Planning,
stated, "There is no economic model in the world that we
can't transplant here." 141 Within the regime though,
139 Quoted in Peter H. Smith, "Argentina: The
Uncertain Warriors", Current History . February 1987. p. 62.
140 Gary W. Wynia, "Democracy In Argentina," Current
History . February 1985, p. 55.
141 Quoted in Whitehead, "Whatever Became of the
Southern Cone Model?" Chile After 1973: Elements for the
Analysis of Military Rule , p. 9.
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serious disagreements over economic strategy existed. When
Viola came to power, for example, Martinez de Hoz was
forced to leave. When General Galtieri came to power,
less than a year later (as Viola was forced to resign due
to his "soft" stand economically and politically in the
face of civilian criticism of the military government) , he
too announced a new economic strategy. Within the military
organization, the old motivations for staying in government
were waning.
Fractionalization grew within the military organi-
zation due to loss of faith over mission disorientation in
internal security and the seeming inability to control the
economy. The "dirty war" campaign, which initially was a
source of external legitimacy, now directly influenced a
growing illegitimacy because of the huge number of
disappearances (later estimated to be possibly as high as
3 5,000) and because of the stark contrast it posed to the
regime's goal to improve moral standards (as part of the
Proceso) . Regime fractionalization split into two main
camps, the "duros" who wanted to expand repression and the
"blandos" who leaned toward accommodation with acceptable
political forces in the country. Once fractionalization
became evident to society in general, political activation
began to expand. "Yet as the parties reasserted themselves
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in 1980, the concerned, control-oriented officers turned
defensive once again." 142
With an organizational culture that isolated the
regime from civil society and international realities, and
with no one left to blame for failure, the regime chose a
classic nonsolution—war. The Falklands/ Malvinas War
pitted Argentina against the United Kingdom. The status of
the South Atlantic archipelago has been contested since
1592 and was a popular aspirational national interest, but
never an operational interest. Still, capability seemed to
be in Argentina's favor (in the minds of the regime) at
this remote corner of British power. Other factors
involved in the decision were the concern over Chilean
extension of power in the south, including the Beagle
Channel Islands dispute, the seeming acquiescence of the
United States in light of Argentina's support of the U.S.
Central America policy, and the hope that Britain would be
forced to "swallow this fated pill." Instead, (and even
with some heroic efforts by Air Force and Naval aviation)
Argentina's military was defeated. The Malvinas War defeat
acted as a catalyst toward regime transition by solidifying
the negative international influences against the military,
completely eliminating any remaining external legitimacy
142 Gary W. Wynia, "Illusion and Reality in
Argentina," Current History . February 1981, p. 84.
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for the regime, rupturing the boundaries of organizational
culture and again unsettling mission orientation.
In the final analysis, transition was initiated in
Argentina by the sufficient condition of fractionalization
within the military organization (see Figure 5) . A loss of
mission orientation began the movement toward transition.
First, the execution of the Proceso left the military
without an internal security mission due to their success
in eliminating the threat from the left. Their failure in
all other facets of the Proceso (e.g. economic stabiliza-
tion, restoration of "proper" moral values, and creation of
"authentic representative democracy") left many in the
military unsure as to proper strategies and goals. The
synthesis of the categorical and hypothetical obligations
was still intact at this point. Only when the regime
failed to reestablish consensus within their own ruling
elite did they loose sight of their objectives (e.g.
continuing the dirty war even though in reality it was
over)
.
Fractionalization grew within the regime and within
the apparatus. The split between the duros and the
blandos was not synonymous with the split of those who
believed in the military's categorical obligation and
those who held a hypothetical outlook, but by the time
Galtieri came to power the stage was set for transition
initiation. Many in the regime felt by this time that
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they were erasing with one hand what they were writing
with the other. On the sixth anniversary of the coup,
Galtieri announced the commencement of a plan for redemo-
cratization, one that he hoped would return him to
leadership as the elected President in 1984. Galtieri'
s
secret meetings with Peronist leaders to gain their support
(anathema to many in the military) , failure of economic
policies, and an awakening disagreement with the continua-
tion of the dirty war, completed the split between those
who still felt the military had the duty to remain in power
and those who felt the country and the military would be
better served with a return to democracy.
With fractionalization rampant, organizational culture
began to break down. Military traditions, standard
operating procedures and trust in the corporate structure
decayed to new lows. With mission orientation and now
organizational culture in states of flux, external
legitimacy became a pivotal issue. The insular protection
from society's demands that the regime had enjoyed in
previous years, was gone. Those officers who still held a
hypothetical obligation for military rule were beginning to
be swayed by the lack of external legitimacy. Galtieri
attempted to revitalize the hypothetical/categorical
synthesis by invading the Malvinas. It was hoped this
action would establish a new mission orientation for the
military and revitalize organizational culture. Proving
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nationally popular it would establish a new external
legitimacy for the regime, so as to build a new obligation-
al common identity in the military. Defeat in the Malvinas
only quickened a transition already in progress. The
"resurrection of civil society" confirmed the end of the
regime and transition culminated with the October 1983
election of President Raul Alfonsin.
C. BRAZIL 1964-1985143
On 1 April, 1964 the military took control of the
government for the first time in the 2 0th century. Eight
days later the Supreme Military Command issued the First
Institutional Act declaring this takeover as a revolution,
not just a coup, and granted vast powers to the new
military regime. The military had come to power in the
wake of what the military saw as the pro-communist, but
popular (even with some of the military) , Goulart regime.
Because of the military ruling elite's fear of possible
breakdown of the fragile coup coalition, the goals and
programs of the new regime were vague, talking about
143 Reference works on Brazil include, Thomas C.
Bruneau and Philippe Faucher, eds . Authoritarian
Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary Economic and Political
Development
,
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1981) ; Peter Evans,
"Three Views of Regime Change and Party Organization in
Brazil," Politics and Society vol. 15 no. 1 (1986-1987),
pp. 1-22; Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics ,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) ; Robert
Wesson and David V. Fleischer, Brazil in Transition . (New
York: Praeger, 1983) .
133
control of the communists, and establishment of some
political and economic reforms. Those officers who posed a
"counterrevolutionary" threat to the regime were purged.
Only ten days after the coup, 122 officers were expelled
from the military and further expulsions continued for
almost a year. 144 Still, most officers saw the need for a
military government as temporary.
Unity in the Castello Branco regime was maintained by a
shared mission orientation that had been fostered in World
War Two with the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) and
through the socialization process of the Superior War
College (ESG) . By 1967 and the selection of General Costa
e Silva as President, only one of the five key members of
the ruling staff was an FEB member and had attended the
ESG, highlighting the growing cleavages in the regime.
1967-1974 marked a more militant authoritarian period,
first with Costa e Silva and then, on his death, with
General Medici. As the military tarried in government,
leftist guerrilla activity also grew, giving the new basis
for mission orientation. Opposition from the church and
various demonstrations of opposition, such as the student
revolt in December of 1968 only strengthened the military's
belief that only they could move the country toward higher
development because they were not tied to any classes or
interest groups that would resist reform. By 1969,
144 Stepan, The Military in Politics , p. 223.
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repression was increased to meet the threat from radical
groups that hoped to incite public anger against the
regime. Instead, the public was more alienated by the
leftist tactics than the military's tactics of suppression.
Although the Medici regime established a reputation for
severe tactics, the level of deaths, disappearances, and
torture never reached the numbers of Argentina. The other
important goal of the Brazilian military was economic
development, as the Doctrine of National Security and
Development highlights. Between 1968 and 1973 Brazil
achieved one of the highest growth rates (e.g. the
Brazilian GNP grew at an annual average of over 10.0%
during this period145 ) in the hemisphere and was high-
lighted as an example of what authoritarian modernizing
strategy could accomplish.
A key factor running through every government, from
1964 on, was the military's effort to restructure politics.
An important source of external legitimacy for the regime
was the "support" of Congress. No government closed
Congress for longer than a month, and beginning with
General Castello Branco, every military president was
indirectly "elected" by Congress. Because of the less
defined mission orientation and fragile organizational
culture, external legitimacy played a more important role
in supporting the hypothetical obligation of the majority
145 Wesson and Fleischer, Brazil in Transition , p. 37.
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of officers, than in such countries as Argentina or Chile.
Using Congress, the military attempted, through political
jeito and casuismos (gerrymandering, electoral
engineering, etc.) to establish a pro military party, the
National Renovating Alliance (ARENA) and a loyal opposi-
tion, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) . These
actions by the military were generally accepted by the
country because Brazilian political culture dictated that
it is better to play the military's game, than not to play
at all.
By 1974 the accomplishments of the military began to
unravel. Economic growth began to stagnate. The first
OPEC oil shock of 1973 was beginning to be felt (as Brazil
imported 75% of its oil 146 ) . The PMDB does better than
ARENA in congressional elections, and from that time on,
each election became a negative referendum on the military
government. All serious guerrilla threats were eliminated,
leaving that mission of the military hollow. Fractionali-
zation grew between the moderates and hardliners over
strategy and political purpose of the military in govern-
ment. To maintain control over the deteriorating situation
and to distance themselves from the more severe repression
of the early 1970s, the military was forced to change its
policies toward loosening their control on government.
146 wynia, The Politics of Latin American Develop-
ment , p . 22 3
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Transition initiation began with the selection of
General Ernesto Geisel, a moderate, as president in 1974.
He established a distensao (relaxation or decompression) of
military rule which was subsequently termed abertura
(opening) . Arbitrary arrests and torture all but disap-
peared and censorship was eased. All manner of political
jeito was attempted by the regime, as they feared loosing
control of the transition process. Geisel also reminded
the Congress and the country who was still in charge when
he shut down Congress for their refusal to pass a govern-
ment sponsored judicial reform bill in April of 1977.
Geisel then enacted his "April Package" of measures
designed to ensure ARENA victories in the 1978 election.
Although opposition grew with these set backs to liberali-
zation, the military remained in firm control. In 1979 the
Fifth Institutional Act was repealed, a "two way" amnesty
package was adopted, and the complex matter of presidential
succession was overcome with the selection of General Joao
Baptista Figueiredo. The transition from military rule
continued, but with some set backs. Political party reform
was implemented in 1979, but this also split the opposition
PMDB into smaller parties. Some concern over the future of
abertura was created when General Golbery do Costa e Silva
resigned in 1981, but the opening continued. General
elections (local, state, governor, House and Senate) were
held in 1982, but no split voting was allowed (same party
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vote, top to bottom) and no coalitions were allowed. Due
to the problematic health of General Figueiredo and the
continual pressure of opposition groups, the indirect
election of Brazil's first civilian president in two
decades took place in 1985. President Tancredo Neves won
as the opposition candidate to the military backed party.
Neves' sudden illness then death just prior to his
inauguration resulted in Jose Sarney (elected vice-
president) becoming president.
The causal pattern of transition initiation in Brazil
was much more complex and tenuous than that of Argentina.
The planned lack of a well defined and rigid mission
orientation (for fear of upsetting the coalition synthesis
of the categorical obligation and hypothetical obligation)
was always a factor that directly influenced the stability
of obligational legitimacy. The regime was able to make up
for this weakness by an atypical reliance (for a ruler-type
military regime) on external legitimacy to help support
the hypothetical obligation of a majority of the officer
corps. This was a workable relationship from 1964-1967
because of the relatively light demands placed on the
regime by society and because of the initial purges of
opponents. Once it became clear that this was not an
arbitrator type regime, but the first of the ruler regimes
of South America, society became more demanding. The
military regime, partly to protect its obligational
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legitimacy synthesis and partly to achieve its goals,
became more alienated from society and established a
stronger mission orientation through the Doctrine of
National Security and Development147 Complete insulation
from society was not possible due to the military's tradi-
tionally permeable organizational culture, but external
legitimacy was bolstered with the economic miracle and the
unpopular tactics of the leftist guerrillas.
Mission orientation was again changing by 1974 because
the economic miracle and the guerrilla threat did not last.
Neither of these issues were pivotal for the military
taking power or leaving power, but they were important
factors in shaping the necessary condition of a weak
mission orientation. Organizational culture was relatively
permeable and flexible throughout the tenure of military
rule. Before 1974 this gatekeeper was not required to
protect the military from the demands of society, and in
fact was kept fairly permeable in the miracle years (and
147 Ironically, this doctrine was, in large part,
developed by General Golbery of the ESG, both of which
fell from favor during the Costa e Silva and Medici
regimes when it was applied most intensely. Certainly
there were core beliefs, like obligational legitimacy,
that permeated the entire officer corps, but strategies
caused cleavages that all attempted to avoid. In John
Markoff and Silvio R. Duncan Baretta, "Professional
Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil: A Critique of a
Thesis of Alfred Stepan," Comparative Politics . Vol. 17
(January 1985), pp. 183-186; the authors suggest that Costa
e Silva and Medici dropped the detailed aspects of ESG
thinking and used useful portions of NSD to support their
more intense orientation of governmental control.
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assumedly positive external legitimacy) so as to strengthen
the hypothetical obligation for military rule. As external
legitimacy became more negative, there were no gatekeepers
in place to protect the military. In Brazil, unlike
Argentina, external legitimacy had been a useful tool for
maintenance of military unity. Now it became a factor in
increasing fractionalization. The loss of external
legitimacy was not a sufficient condition for the breakdown
of obligational legitimacy (because even in Brazil other
factors such as the recent proof of the miracle years
showed that sometimes unpopular policies were needed to
develop) . Its loss has shown to be necessary (because if
it had remained high, it would have been difficult to
breakdown the hypothetical obligation) . Fractionalization
was the key outcome of a low organizational culture and
loss of external legitimacy. Why, if by the end of 1974,
all the causal conditions were in place for obligational
legitimacy breakdown, the transition still took eleven
years (and it could be argued that it will not be complete
until a civilian president is directly elected)? Transi-
tion initiation does not guarantee transition completion.
Brazil is the case in point that the military chooses to
leave power, and if at any time during or after the process
that obligational legitimacy is reconstituted the transi-
tion process could reverse itself. The importance of
"societal mobilization" to reassert themselves in
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government is highlighted here as an important post
transition initiation condition for successful completion
of a transition. Without the mobilization, the military
could more easily consolidate their obligational legitimacy
and reverse the transition process.
D. PERU 1968-1980148
In 19 68, Peru's military again took control of
government, but this time with more than an arbitrator's
role. This regime differed from Argentina's, or Brazil's,
in that it didn't involve a coalition with any other groups
in civil society. In the past, the Peruvian military had
intervened in government in support of the conservative
elite. The military also had a great distrust for APRA
(Alianza Popular Revolucionaria American, the major
reformist party) because of its anti military stance. At
first glance, the military's intervention in 1968 was
seemingly in response to the probable victory of APRA the
next year. In actuality though, the military acted out of
their disgust for Peru's subservience to foreign capital
148 Reference studies on Peru include, Cynthia
McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian
Experiment Reconsidered , (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1983); Liisa North and Tanya Korovkin, The Peruvian
Revolution and the Officers in Power 1967-1976 . (Montreal:
Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University,
1981) ; Thomas G. Sanders, "The Politics of Transition in
Peru," Fieldstaff Reports , vol. 24 (1977); Alfred Stepan,
The State and Society, Peru in Comparative Perspective ,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)
.
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and because of the civilian failure to come to terms with
the growing dissatisfaction and restlessness in the rural
portions of the country. Although the military leaders of
the various services were able to come to terms (after
lengthy negotiations) to make the coup a unified action,
the vast majority of the population and international
interests opposed the coup. As time went on the regime did
build support through inclusion of the lower class, because
a key element in the Peruvian hypothetical obligation was
to build a popular foundation for a reorganized Peruvian
state.
The military regime, under the leadership of General
Juan Velasco Alvarado, closed political parties and
suppressed potential opponents, but never resorted to the
serious systematic campaigns of terror found in the
Southern Cone. Their goals, encompassed in the "Plan
Inca," included establishing a new economic order with a
nexus of development and security. Key issues of their
program were agrarian reform and elimination of upper class
political and economic power. The regime held a genuine
sympathy for the plight of the long-oppressed peasantry,
due partially to the traumatic experience of a few years
earlier, when in suppressing a small guerrilla uprising
they killed 8,000 peasants, left 19,000 homeless, 3,500 in
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jail and destroyed 14,000 hectares of land. 149 Almost
immediately after the coup, the regime expropriated
International Petroleum Company (IPC, a Standard Oil of New
Jersey subsidiary), then ITT in 1969, Chase-Manhattan Bank
in 1970, Cerro de Pascoa in 1974 and Marcona Mining in
1975. Even after some agreements were reached with the
international community, the regime was not popular in
international financial circles. Their domestic external
legitimacy grew, however, through their efforts to
integrate the marginalized sectors of civil society. By
1974 the agrarian elite had disappeared as a power elite
and by 1979 almost no land remained in the hands of huge
estates. The military regime also increased their external
legitimacy through such programs as the Sistema Nacional de
Apoyo a la Mobilizacion Social (SINAMOS) , the Agrarian
Production Cooperative (CAP) , and the Agriculture Societies
of Social Interest (SAIS)
.
The Velasco regime lasted from 1968 to 1975 and, on
the surface, accomplished many of its original goals.
Nationalization of industry and agrarian reform were the
center pieces, but real reform was still out of grasp. The
Velasco regime attempted to implement the ideas that were
developed at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM)
which saw reform as crucial to long term national security.
149 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern




Reforms, for the most part were shallow (such as the
agrarian reform effort which left over 300,000 rural
families still landless because of nonavailability of
land150 ) , or hollow, due to poor planning, inadequate
administration, little thought of consequences, and not
enough trained personnel to implement many of these complex
reforms, (such as SINAMOS) . External conditions began to
crumble, adding failure to failure, with a sharp decline in
export earnings with the fishmeal industry disappearing
almost completely, a drop in sugar and copper prices and no
new oil discoveries. The foreign debt grew and IMF forced
austerity measures led to 58% unemployment and a real
income decline of 40% between 1973 and 1978. The tradi-
tional elites were already alienated and the middle class
and large sectors of the lower class began opposing
military rule. With an organizational culture that was
already permeable and flexible, as exhibited by their
radical support of the lower class, the regime began to
crumble with this external onslaught.
Uncertainty of mission orientation became apparent in
1975 with a palace revolution placing General Morales
Bermundez in power. Under Velasco, the military regime had
made a great effort to define their justifying ideology,
which included the concepts revolutionary, nationalist,




Christian and socialist. Under Bermundez, the regime
dropped socialist from its self-description and all but
dropped any concern for a self-justifying ideology.
Bermundez also purged most of the reformist officers from
the military shortly after taking power to break from this
ideological past. The major efforts of this second regime
were to establish an apertura (political opening) and get
the economy under control. In 1977 Morales Bermundez
unveiled Plan Tupac Amaru to set up a constituent assembly
in 1978 and general elections in 1980. His economic
policies concentrated on austerity, privatization of
industry, elimination of anti-United States rhetoric and
willingness to comply with IMF measures to acquire new
loans. Although the economic morass was still a serious
issue, politically the transition was accomplished as
planned. In 1980 Fernando Belaunde Terry was elected by a
42% majority. His election marked the final demise of a
movement among some younger officers to take back power and
complete the revolution.
Transition initiation in Peru occurred with the palace
coup of Bermundez. Mission orientation was the first
variable to influence a change in the military common
identity. Prior to 1973, mission orientation had not posed
a challenge to the obligational legitimacy of the Velasco
regime. The radical theories born at the CAEM and assured
as the majority influence through early ideologically
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motivated purges of the officer corps assured a fairly
solid common identity within the regime and the apparatus.
By 197 3 however, as North and Korovkin point out,
As the military government found itself increasingly
exposed to a flow of contradictory pressures and demands
from both opposition parties and the participatory
organizations it had created, the two components of the
government's self -def inition— "revolutionary" and
"military institutional"—became incompatible. 151
Still, obligational legitimacy was not threatened with
breakdown because the obligation to achieve the goals of
development and long term security had not changed, only
the strategies were coming into question. This movement
in mission orientation also did not cause any serious
fractionalization because, on the surface it seemed that
real changes were being realized and those officers
rejecting the categorical or hypothetical obligation to
remain in power were in the distinct minority. Not until
the threat of loss of political capital and the complete
loss of external legitimacy led to serious fractionaliza-
tion did obligational legitimacy breakdown. The potential
loss of political capital did not get to the point of
sufficiency itself to cause obligational legitimacy
breakdown, but instead amplified the growing cleavages in
the military organization. Because the government was
being run almost entirely by the military itself, the loss
of human capital was not an issue, but the economic
151 North and Korovkin, The Peruvian Revolution and
the Officers in Power 1967-1976 , p. 102.
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situation decayed to the point of potential governmental
bankruptcy. The regime's alienation of international
business interests (through its rhetoric and
nationalization program) almost assured complacency by the
rest of the world. Fractionalization was further induced
by a low organizational culture that was unable to protect
the military organization from the demands from all sides
of society, including the lower class who was once the
supporter of the regime (and indirect supporter of the
hypothetical obligation of many in the military) . This
example, like that of Brazil, also points out the pos-
sibility of a transition reversing itself. Again it was
the resurgence of an able and willing civil society that




The military takeover in Uruguay has been called the
"slow motion coup." The military intervened in government
gradually, ultimately imposing a ruler-type regime. From
1973 until 1976, when they forced President Juan Maria
Bordaberry to resign and took complete control, the
military came to oversee the police, the news media,
Congress, labor unions, and the economy. The military
intervention was imposed as the economy continued to decay,
political violence increased and government became more and
more paralyzed and corrupt. All three of these factors
decreased the legitimacy of the elected government and any
ability of that government to get control of the ever
worsening situation. On 23 June 1973, President Bordaberry
established a civil-military dictatorship, "at the
suggestion of the military," in an attempt to control the
chaos. The National Assembly was dissolved as well as the
152 Reference works for Uruguay include, Juan Rial,
"Political Parties and Elections in the Process of
Transition," Comparing New Democracies. Transition and
Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern
Cone , ed. Enrique Baloyra, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987)
,
pp. 241-268; Howard Handleman, "Prelude to Elections: The
Military's Legitimacy Crisis in the 1980 Constitutional
Plebiscite in Uruguay," Charles C. Gillespie, "Activists
and Floating Voters: The Unheeded Lessons of Uruguay's 1982
Primaries," and Juan Rial, "The Uruguayan Elections of
1984: A Triumph of the Center," Elections and
Democratization in Latin America , eds. Paul W. Drake and
Eduardo Silva, (San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin
American Studies and Center for U.S. -Mexican Studies
Institute of the Americas, 198 6); Luis E. Gonzalez,
"Uruguay, 1980-81: An Unexpected Opening," Latin American
Research Review
.
Vol. 28, no. 3 (1983), pp. 63-76.
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National Labor Congress (CNT) and all leftist political
parties. The military operated through an "advisory " arm
of the president called the Consejo de Seguiridad Nacional
(COSENA, the national security council) . The coup had very
little external legitimacy associated with it. The threats
perceived by the military were not shared by most of
society and the ruthless and aggressive manner in which the
military crushed any opposition highlighted its dangers as
worse than the unpopular civilian government it had
deposed.
The military regime in Uruguay lacked the common
identity for obligational legitimacy and even for a clear
mission orientation in 1973. This is perhaps the central
reason for the "slow motion coup" process. There were
three general groups of officers, the legalists (who saw
their role as the traditional protectors of democracy) , the
hardliners (also called "Brazilianists" who advocated a
strong militaristic response to the growing chaos) and the
populists (also called Peruvianists, who wanted the
military to intervene, but also called for a response that
would correct social and economic inequality) . Because of
this fractionalization, about the only thing the military
could agree to act in unity on was the war against the
Tupamaros. Even before the military "semi-coup" in 1973,
the Tupamaros had been crushed, but the military became
preoccupied with its war against all leftists, labor
149
leaders, politicians and students who were thought to
support the Tupamaro movement. By 1976, thousands of
people had been arrested, tortured and imprisoned (a
greater proportion of the country's population than any
other nation in the world153 ) . This brought a strong
response of international condemnation against the
military, but had little effect. In 1978, for example, the
Law of State Emergency declared that a person could be
arrested and held for thinking "anti-government
thoughts." 154
Other important reasons why the military was slow to
completely take-over the government were the small size and
lack of political experience of the military organization.
The total size of the military at the time of the coup was
7,000 members. 155 The officer corps came primarily from
the lower middle class of the rural areas of the country.
This meant their social ties in government or with the
elite were almost nonexistent. Their education and
training in governmental affairs was also lacking. For
these reasons, the military left portions of the govern-
ment, such as the technical matters of the economy, almost
entirely to civilian control. Between 1973 and 1978, the
153 Ronald H. McDonald, "The Struggle for Normalcy in




155 Ibid, p. 69.
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military followed an economic policy closely parallel to
the orthodox policies of Argentina under Martinez de Hoz
.
These policies were popular with the country's industrial
leaders, and some progress toward economic recovery was
made, but at a very high cost. Living standards dropped by
as much as 50% from 1972-1982, economic inequality rose
instead of decreased, capital flight became rampant, and
inflation stayed out of control (topping 80% in 1979)
.
The military was able to establish a weak obligational
legitimacy synthesis by 1976 and take complete control of
the government. The legalist faction that had tempered the
drive by others for full military intervention was greatly
reduced by 1976. As late as 1977 over 20 officers were
arrested for urging a return to civilian rule. A follow-on
decree made retirement mandatory for any officer who did
not follow the regime line. Relations within the ranks of
this coalition remained strained. The coalition of many
variances of the hypothetical obligation (e.g. reform of
economics, renovation of the corrupt political system,
destruction of all subversion) made coherent rule difficult
at best. As is highlighted by the naming of the hardliner
and populist divisions in the military after the regime
characteristics of other South American regimes, the
military in Uruguay was very much aware and affected by
outside influences. When the military regime in Chile
successfully executed a constitutional plebescite in 1980,
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which ratified the rule of Pinochet, the Uruguayan military
elite saw this as a way to finally unify the military and
establish a clear, but far reaching role for the military
in the future.
The new constitution, drafted by the Armed Forces
Committee on Political Matters (COMASPO)
,
gave a continu-
ingly strong role in government, banned all parties or
groups of leftist orientation, established a very weak
Congress, and diluted the role of political parties
(especially the semi-autonomous factions which made up the
political parties called sub-lemas) . Even with the
regime's heavy reliance on civilians in government, the
military organization was almost totally unaware of the
political feelings of civil society. Also, the military,
by this time, was completely isolated from any communica-
tion with opposition groups. The campaign to gain support
for the plebiscite was well-run and almost all tactics to
skew the voting response to the military cause was taken
advantage of. Still, on 30 November 1980, the plebiscite
failed by a margin of 57.2% to 42.8%. 156 With this
embarrassing defeat, the military fractionalized, with
those holding a categorical obligation for military rule
156 Handelman, "Prelude to Elections: The Military's
Legitimacy Crisis and the 1980 Constitutional Plebiscite in
Uruguay," Elections and Democratization in Latin America ,
p. 212.
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interpreting the results in a positive light, 157 and those
of the military with a hypothetical obligation viewing this
as a complete rejection by society of military rule. The
lack of external legitimacy had always been present, but
the results of this plebiscite broke through any barriers
of isolation the military had erected. When General
Alvarez acceded to the presidency in 1981, the military was
further fractionalized. Again, in November of 1981 with
the selection of political party leadership, the votes
reflected a negative referendum of the military regime.
By 1983 a serious dialogue between the political parties
and the military were taking place. In 1984 the Pact of
the Naval Club allowed for the peaceful exit of the
military from government, with a two-way amnesty allowing
the leftist Frente Amplio to participate in the political
process and the guarantee of no reprisals for the repres-
sive actions of the military while in power. As with Peru,
Brazil and Argentina, the civilian political society of
Uruguay was able to forge a "concertacion, " or consocia-
tional front (minus the Blancos who chose to maintain their
free agency) to help ensure the completion of the military
transition from rule.
157 Lt. General Luis Quierola, for example, suggested
that the majority of "no" votes were those who were
satisfied with the incumbent regime. Charles G. Gillespie,
"Activists and Floating Voters: The Unheeded Lessons of
Uruguay's 1982 Primaries," Elections and Democratization in
Latin America. 1980-1985 , p. 213.
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Transition initiation in Uruguay was ultimately caused
by the sufficient condition of fractionalization. Mission
orientation was always at a very confused state, making it
difficult for those officers with a categorical obligation
to establish obligational legitimacy in the military
organization. The slow process of taking power highlights
the lack of obligational legitimacy of this regime. Even
when fully in control, beginning in 1976, fractionalization
was a key concern for the regime. Every effort was made to
find ways to shore up their obligational legitimacy, from a
preoccupation with the perceived threat from the left, to
the attempt to duplicate the ratification of military rule
in Chile with their own constitutional plebiscite. It
should be pointed out that this small, relatively untrained
and only slightly obligationally legitimate military was
able to establish their rule because the entire scenario
took place in one fairly small city, Montevideo. Once the
military controlled the city in 1976, they controlled the
government
.
External legitimacy was not a key factor in supporting
the military's hypothetical obligation, until the plebi-
scite, because their organizational culture (built with a
lower middle class, rural, already alienated officer corps)
kept the military isolated from the demands of society.
The results expected and later interpreted by some military
officers manifests this fact. The message of the
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plebiscite was undeniable and a surprising revelation to
many in the military and even the isolation effect of
organizational culture could no longer protect the regime
from obligational legitimacy breakdown. The degree of
fractionalization is what led the regime to attempt the
strengthening of obligational legitimacy through external
legitimacy, and the results sealed the fate of the regime.
F. CHILE 1973-PRESENT158
On 11 September 1973 the Chilean military seized the
government in a decisive coup that left President Salvador
Allende dead (either by murder or suicide) . The coup had a
popular backing both within the country and international-
ly. The socialist government of Allende had led the
country into a severe economic crisis through heavy
government spending (Allende 's first year in office
produced a deficit that amounted to 3 6% of the country's
158 References for Chile include, Genaro Arriagada
Herrera, "The Legal and Institutional Framework of the
Armed Forces in Chile," Military Rule in Chile , eds. J.
Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, (Washington,
D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Silvia T.
Borzutzky, "The Pinochet Regime: Crisis and Consolida-
tion," Authoritarians and Democrats, Regime Transitions in
Latin America , eds. James M. Malloy and Mitchell A.
Seligson, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1987), pp. 67-92; David E. Hojman, ed. , Chile After 1973:
Elements for the Analysis of Military Rule . (Liverpool:
Center for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool,
1985); Carlos Huneeus, "From Diarchy to Polyarchy:
Prospects for Democracy in a Latecomer, Chile," Comparing
New Democracies, Transition and Consolidation in
Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone , ed. Enrique A.
Baloyra, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 109-152;
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total budget) , inflationary monetary policies, exhaustion
of consumer and industrial inventory with no replacement,
and drastic tax hikes that cut usable income over 25%. In
addition, food shortages were becoming commonplace, as were
the resultant women's marches, strikes, and street vio-
lence. Allende's legitimacy was tenuous at best even
before these problems. He was elected with only 36.2% of
the vote, less than 39,000 votes from the second place
candidate, Alessandri. 159 Also, this 36.2% represented a
fragile coalition (Unidad Popular) of radical Marxists to
center left factions. By the time the military came to
power, all but Allende's coalition heralded the coup.
The military regime in Chile has gone through several
stages of self-definition and the goals they are striving
to attain. Initially the regime claimed they assumed power
to restore justice, peace and normalcy to the country. By
1974, with the release of the Declaration of Principles of
the Government of Chile, the regime was redefining their
role. This document clearly stated that the regime had not
"set timetables for their management of the government,
because the task of rebuilding the country morally,
institutionally, and economically requires prolonged and
profound action." 160 In ensuring this ruler regime stance,
159 Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende , p. 107.
160 Genaro Arriagada Herrera, "The Legal and
Institutional Framework of the Armed Forces in Chile,"
Military Rule in Chile , p. 119.
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purges of the officer corps were made. By 1976, 29
generals were forced into retirement. In July of 1978,
General Leigh, Commander of the Air Force and Junta member,
and 11 other Air Force generals were forcibly retired.
Also, within a year after the coup, the system of officer
assessments and promotions were altered, giving greater
power to the individual services and their commanders.
This helped strengthen the already strong loyalty to
immediate commanders and the military hierarchy fostered by
the Prussian tradition. As a foreign diplomat remarked in
1978, "If there is any fissure in the Armed Forces, it is
not between the conservatives and liberals, but between
the hawks and pragmatic conservatives." 161 The rigid and
impermeable organizational culture of the most profes-
sional military in South America was hermetic by the 1978
purges.
The mission orientation of the regime became clearly
defined by the end of 1974, taking on a counterinsurgency
and geopolitical definition of national security. General
Pinochet (a professor and author of geopolitics texts
himself) was established as sole head of the executive and
administrative organs of government in June of 1974. In
1975, the National Objective of the Government of Chile was
published which placed national security and counterinsur-
161 Quoted in Rozenkranz, "The Church in Chilean
Politics: The Confusing Years," Chile After 1973: Elements
for Analysis of Military Rule , p. 78.
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gency as the military's primary function. Political
repression grew, as did the main arm of this repression
—
the National Department of Intelligence (DINA) . United
Nations estimates in 1976 placed the number of Chileans
"detained" since the coup at 40,000 to 95,000. Interna-
tional influence had little effect on the repression in
Chile. Not until protests from Catholic bishops in Chile
were raised, such as Cardinal Silva's episcopal statement
"Reconciliation in Chile," did significant changes occur.
Due to the efforts of many international organizations and
the influence of the U.S., DINA was dismantled (but
replaced by the Central de Informaciones, CNI) , and
repression became more controlled and surgical. It is
important to note that by this time Pinochet's power was
solidly entrenched and the once very real threat from the
left was almost defeated. Repression continues even today,
but is mostly wielded in the form of putting down protests,
such as the mass demonstration in July of 1983 when 18,000
troops joined with police killing 27 people.
A year after the coup, the military regime presented
their program for the second major concern that had lead to
the chaos of the early 1970s, economic recovery through an
aggressive free market monetarist orientation. The
"Chicago Boys" followed an ultra orthodox set of policies
based on the eradication of the protectionist system set up
in the 1930s and strict state control of the money supply.
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Through the late 1970s, the export sector of the economy
was favored over the domestic sector. Unemployment rose,
as did the foreign debt, but the fiscal deficit was elimi-
nated, inflation was reduced to less than 30% per year,
and growth was stimulated. Intertwined in this economic
model was the "silent revolution" which established new
structures for labor relations, education, and organization
of professional associations. The hope was to establish
new values and belief systems of future generations, thus
overcoming the factionalized political society that still
could not build any lasting consociational groups, even in
the face of a military-authoritarian regime. The interna-
tional oil shock of 1979 began the downfall of the Chilean
monetarist system. By 1982, the Chicago Boys had led the
country into the worst depression in the country's history.
The government was forced to deprivatize much of the
failing major industries and banks so that by the end of
1982, 34.3% of the financial sector was government
owned. 162 Despite the depression, inflation rose to 20.7%
that year. 163
During the high point of the Chilean "economic
miracle," Pinochet took the advantage to further con-
solidate his power and highlight to the world Chilean
162 Borzutzky, "The Pinochet Regime," Authoritarians





society's agreement with the military's obligational
legitimacy (at a time when the church and the United
Nations were criticizing his tactics) . In 1978 Pinochet
presented a plebiscite to the people of Chile calling on
them to support his administration. He later used the
results to link himself directly to the people and
effectively eliminating the junta from the governmental
power structure. In 1980 the National Advisory Council
presented Pinochet with a new draft constitution which
Pinochet altered and then put forth in a short notice
plebiscite. Only one opposition meeting was allowed and it
proved counter productive to the opposition. The choice,
as presented on the ballot, was between Pinochet and
leftist chaos. The plebiscite won with 68% of the vote.
A transition seemed to be in the offing with the
economic failure culminating in 1983. Sergio Onofre Jarpa,
a civilian, was brought into the regime as Minister of the
Interior. Censorship ended and exiles were allowed to
return. Parties, although officially still illegal, were
allowed to become more active. Yet, when the MIR assas-
sinated the military governor of Santiago, the regime
clamped down again (as they would later with the attempted
assassination of Pinochet and the discovery of arms caches)
and refused to negotiate. Whether a real transition was
really about to be initiated is still open to debate.
Pinochet would like to remain in power indefinitely and if
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he thought he had (and could) do it through transition, it
may happen. His official roles in the present regime, as
President, Commander of the Army, and Commander and Chief
of the Armed Forces, will keep him in power at least until
1989. His unofficial, but key roles, as personal in-
tegrator of day-to-day politics and coordinator of the
civil/military governing coalition may very well spell the
end of the military in government once he is gone.
Although Pinochet is virtually alone in his belief that he
should remain in power indefinitely, the rigid loyalty
system of the military's organizational culture and the
lack of any powerful, central figure to replace him will
support him for the time being. The Mission orientation of
the military has not changed appreciably either. Nor has
the military been politicized to the point of loss of
professionalism. In fact, according to Marcelo Mancilla
Betti, Professor at the Academia de Guerra and Academia
Nacional de Estudios Politicos y Estategicos, the Army's
self-image has been greatly strengthened and is better
equipped than civilians to govern the country. 164 In
short, organizational culture, mission orientation, and the
lack of any organized, consociational external demand for
transition will continue to foster a strong obligational
legitimacy in Chile. The lack of any serious
164
"Strong Chilean Army Distrusts Civilians," Latin
American Weekly Report , 6 August 1987, pp. 6-7.
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f ractionalization and continued political capital for
governmental operations will also not create any surprise
sufficient condition for transfer of power.
G. IMPLICATIONS FOR OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY THEORY
These case studies highlight several important points.
First, the information from these brief histories of
transition provides the opportunity to inductively test the
independent variables earlier postulated as necessary or
sufficient conditions (see Table 2) . Through the "Method
of Agreement" (dealt with in Chapter 2) we find that low
external legitimacy, low organizational culture, and a
change in mission orientation are indeed present in every
case of transition. Therefore, combined with this theory's
original deductive reasoning, we can be reasonably certain
that these variables are indeed necessary for obligational
legitimacy breakdown.
TABLE 2













Argentina YES YES YES YES
Brazil YES YES YES YES
Peru YES YES YES YES
Uruguay YES YES YES YES
Chile NO NO NO NO
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Through the "Method of Differences," fractionalization is
found to be a sufficient condition because it is present in
every case of transition, but not present in the case of
non transition (see Table 3).
TABLE 3








Argentina YES NO YES
Brazil YES NO YES
Peru YES NO YES
Uruguay YES NO YES
Chile NO NO NO
The causal condition of loss of political capital remains
untested because there were no cases considered where this
variable, in its postulated sufficient condition, was
present. Also, as inferred deductively, the contributing
variables (international influence, economic forces,
political culture, and mission success) proved not to be a
causal factor in the transition histories studied. Some,
like economic forces, were very important, but they were
not sufficient for obligational legitimacy breakdown.
These variables were also not necessary, because another
cause could have taken its place in contributing to
breakdown (e.g. economic forces could have been replaced by
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international influences and still have influenced
transition)
.
These case studies highlight two further points about
the independent variables. First, countervailing forces
should always be considered. Even though a necessary-
variable (or a contributing variable) is in place, it can
be negated by countervailing conditions. For example, the
military regime in Uruguay did not have any external
legitimacy when it came to power, or even after it
established complete control of the government, but
organizational culture protected the military from this
condition until the plebiscite. In other words, external
legitimacy didn't change, organizational culture did. This
brings up the second important point highlighted by the
case studies, the importance of time and space in the
causal pattern of transitions. Local simultaneity (i.e.
happening at the same time and not widely separated) of
variables is critical for causal influence. For example,
when the military regime came to power in Peru, external
legitimacy was not important for the maintenance of
obligational legitimacy. Later, though, after they had
gained some support from the lower class, some officers
began to rely on this external legitimacy for support of
their own hypothetical obligation. When it was withdrawn,
the hypothetical obligation of some in the military was
severely affected. Also, it is important to note that it
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was the lack of external legitimacy from the lower class in
Peru that made the impact, not the support or non support
of the poor of any other country studied here, or positive
or negative international influence. In other words, no
countervailing force changed to stimulate causal influence,
but the right condition at the right time in the right
place did happen. Countervailing forces and local simul-
taneity are constantly at work. Therefore, careful
chronological cataloguing of events according to the
independent variables is important, because, for example, a
necessary condition for obligational legitimacy breakdown
can also be withdrawn from the causal chain, derailing what
would otherwise seem to be a propitious environment for
transition.
Finally, these case studies also further clarify the
roles of the categorical and hypothetical obligation
components of obligational legitimacy. Categorical
obligation is created by the perception of the single
fundamental rule—the military is superior to any other
group and therefore has the moral obligation to rule. To
this minority group, actual policy, strategy and programs
are secondary (but, by definition, will be better than what
any alternative government could produce) . For hypotheti-
cal obligation, as we know, results are what count. Who
benefits from these results is also important to consider.
The pattern of these case studies highlights the ruling
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elite usually attempting to establish utilitarian (most
good for the most people) rather than "ethical egoism"
(most good just for the agent of the action) as the
guiding principle of policy. When obligational legitimacy
is threatened though, the guiding principle becomes ethical
egoism (e.g. the decision—not the execution—to invade the
Malvinas, or creation of false terrorist groups and thus
continuing repression in order to maintain a mission
orientation) . This also usually marks the beginning of the




The Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis is a heuristic
model that attempts to explain why military regimes in
South America choose to leave power. Underlying this
simple statement are several qualifying elements. First,
this model deals only with ruler-type military-as-govern-
ment regimes. These regimes are characterized by a
military that has visibly and/or publicly proclaimed itself
to be the leader of government, where the government is
controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or
a military junta, and where the military institution has
substantial participation in governmental administration.
Furthermore, ruler-type military regimes have little
confidence in civilian rule, reject the existing political
order to some degree, and attempt to create their own
political organization to prolong their rule.
Past studies of military transitions from power have
tended to concentrate on the outcome of these transitions
—
namely liberalization--brushing over, or neglecting
completely the transition itself. Those few studies that
attempt to look at the military either look at the
organization from the outside, or fall short of a complete
167
analysis of military motivations. The second important
element of this hypothesis is that it attempts to look at
the most basic assumptions that set the trajectory for the
military's general view of reality. General views, such as
national security doctrine and geopolitics, all have
foundation assumptions that have their origin in philo-
sophical notions. The concept "obligational legitimacy" is
itself metaphysical and is postulated to be the basic
building block for ruler regime perceptions and actions.
It is defined as the support, acquiescence, and consent for
actions (up to and including coercion) , motivated by
subjective agreement that the military regime has a duty
and obligation to rule, by those belonging to the military
organization. Obligational legitimacy is not a process,
but a common identity that forms the foundation of a
military regimes 's internal justification for actions or
beliefs, specifically in terms of maintaining power.
A third underlying issue relating to the question "why
militaries choose to leave power" is, that they do choose
to leave power. In other words, they are not just a pawn
of other forces, being pushed and pulled in and out of
power. This hypothesis postulates that militaries
relinquish power because of a loss of obligational
legitimacy. Obligational legitimacy breakdown occurs due
to numerous influences inside and outside the military
organization. To study this causal pattern, deductive
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logic is used to clarify and classify the influences
(independent variables) as necessary, sufficient, or
contributing conditions for obligational legitimacy
breakdown (the dependent variable) . This thesis then tests
the conclusions of the hypothesis through the case studies
of the most recent transitions in Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Uruguay. The non transition in Chile is also investi-
gated. Inductive logic is then applied to the postulated
necessary and sufficient conditions of the model which
further confirmed the results of the original formulation.
The fourth underlying issue involves obligational
legitimacy itself. There are many reasons why military
regimes would choose not to leave power, including
historical tendencies, cultural tradition, coercive power,
self-interest, fear of civilian reprisal, self-perpetuation
of power, and underemployment. This theory has argued that
obligational legitimacy must be a critical factor in the
transition process and warrants an in depth investigation.
The components of this entity are a Bismarkian (might makes
right) legitimacy and a deep sense of obligation to rule
within the military organization. The military's monopoly
on coercive power gives it the ability to operationalize
this concept. The obligation portion of this concept is
made up of a synthesis of a categorical obligation (acting
upon a maxim that is thought to be for all men at all
times, in this case—the military is superior to civilian
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governments and therefore has a moral duty to rule) which
is held by a minority of officers; and hypothetical
obligations (desiring the result to the action, in this
case—the end result of military rule is a positive thing)
,
which a majority of officers must hold. Creation of
obligational legitimacy basically consists of building
hypothetical obligation by those holding the categorical
obligation. Maintenance of the synthesis is protecting and
nurturing the hypothetical obligation. Breakdown of
obligational legitimacy is a breakdown of the synthesis.
The fifth, and final, underlying issue is, the nature
of the independent variables. These variables attempt to
encompass the milieu of the South American military regime
and are: international influence, economic forces, external
legitimacy, political capital, political culture, organiza-
tional culture, fractionalization, mission orientation, and
mission success. Together, these independent variables
influence each other and obligational legitimacy, ulti-
mately leading to obligational legitimacy breakdown and
military transition from power.
B. KEY ROLE OF OBLIGATIONAL LEGITIMACY
This study postulates (and is sustained by case study
investigation) , that it is the military organization itself
that removes the military regime from government. As
described above, obligational legitimacy is the pivotal
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factor in this entire process. Because it is part of the
military common identity (of a military-as-government) , and
common identity (unity) is paramount to any professional
military, there are certain natural "gatekeepers" that
protect obligational legitimacy from the stresses inside
and outside the military organization. As this study
highlights, two major gatekeepers are mission orientation
and organizational culture. The disruptive demands of the
regime milieu are the other independent variables. Figure
7 is a conceptual representation of the Obligational
Legitimacy Hypothesis and manifests the key importance of
obligational legitimacy. This entity is placed in such a
pivotal position because military regimes are made up of
people who need to have an understanding of the world
around them and how to react to it. Obligational legiti-

































Within the study of the transition process, there
seem to be five other variables that need to be considered,
one prior to transition initiation and four after initia-
tion, but prior to transition completion. First, Guillermo
O'Donnell places great emphasis on unexpected events, bad
information, etc. (fortuna) as often the decisive cause of
transition initiation. The Malvinas War would seem to fit
this description. Of course obligational legitimacy is the
product of human rationality and is therefore open to
great imperfections. But, circumstances only impose
outcomes as they are filtered through the independent
variables already offered. In the case of the Malvinas
War, it was not the decisive or necessary cause of regime
transition. The fact that other military regime transi-
tions occur without defeat in war points this out.
Obligational legitimacy was already in decay. The military
defeat was only an important catalyst, affecting many of
the independent variables, in a transition already in
progress. In short, "fortuna" is an integral part of any
variable in any model, but not worthy of unique categoriza-
tion as an independent variable.
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After transition initiation, the second variable
that becomes obvious is "resurrection of civil society." 165
This general upsurge, or mobilization, of society occurred
in every successful transition studied here. When it
occurred before transition initiation, it was categorized
under loss of external legitimacy, but after transition
initiation (after obligational legitimacy breakdown) , it
takes on a more singular influence. This is suggested
because in those instances when a transitioning regime,
that is still held externally illegitimate, does not meet
with civil mobilization the regime has a tendency to move
toward reinstating full rule again (e.g. the young officers
movement in Peru which wanted to complete the revolution in
1980) . A third variable closely related to public
mobilization, is the ability of political society to
present an organized consociational front with which to
take over leadership of the government. Again, all
countries that successfully transitioned has done this.
Chile, on the other hand, has been unable to accomplish
this and it has been repeatedly highlighted by the
military. Perhaps if a political consociation had been
presented along with the civil mobilization in 1983, a full
transition (as opposed to continued talk of one) would have
continued. The fourth variable is "pacts," which also seem
165 o'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions From
Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain
Democracies , pp. 48-56.
174
to play an important role in the post initiation phase. As
discussed in Chapter 2, there are many reasons inhibiting
the military from leaving power. A very important one is
fear of civilian reprisal. Not all pacts are explicit like
the Uruguayan "Naval Club Pact." In fact, most pacts are
not written, or very informal "understandings" (e.g.
Brazilian military and Tancredo Neves, Belaunde's announced
intention to respect the results of Velasco's reforms in
Peru, Alfonsin initially letting the military control the
prosecution of "dirty war" offenders) . It would seem that
all three of these variables are necessary (post obliga-
tional legitimacy breakdown) to successfully complete a
transition.
Finally, it is important to note that after
transition initiation, many of the variables offered in the
Obligational Legitimacy Hypothesis take on new meaning and
causal influence. As already highlighted, the component of
external legitimacy termed here resurrection of civil
society, becomes a key factor. Also, international
influence becomes a more important influence after
transition initiation (as demonstrated by the contagion
affect the prosecution of the military in Argentina had on
the creation of the Naval Club Pact in Uruguay, or the U.S.
efforts in the transitions in Haiti and the Philippines)
.
In short, this hypothesis is constructed to study and
explain obligational legitimacy breakdown and transition
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initiation. Although still applicable, extra caution
should be applied when investigating the more complex
transition completion process or consolidation.
2 . Types of Transition
All the case studies investigated here resulted in
a transition to liberalization. In fact, in no transition
from a ruler-type military regime in South America did any
other type of outcome occur. This lessens, somewhat, the
challenge of democratic consolidation, but does not
completely rule out the possibility of transition to
totalitarian regimes. Until recently, the world wide trend
seemed to lean toward establishment of totalitarian
regimes. A prime example often pointed to is the 1979 fall
of the Shah of Iran to a Shi'ite fundamentalist regime that
can be classified as totalitarian. Actually, though, most
totalitarian regimes are the result of revolution, not
transition. Examples of this type are, the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua and the Soviet backed coup in Afghanistan.
The reason the trend of transitions is toward
liberalization is because they usually begin as a political
opening. Remember, military ruler regimes by definition
reject and distrust the civilian political structure. To
establish a political closure toward totalitarianism is to
require the military to mobilize society (and potentially
challenge the military's monopoly on coercive power, as it
did in Nazi Germany) and instill it with a powerful
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ideology and party organization may be more than most
concepts of obligational legitimacy could handle. Even the
semi-corporatist regimes of Peron in Argentina and Vargas
in Brazil did not sit well with the militaries of that time
(i.e. they had not evolved to the ruler-type military yet).
Of course it is possible to begin a transition by political
opening and have it deteriorate into revolution, resulting
in a totalitarian regime. This is highly improbable in
South America, considering the democratic tradition and the
military's fear of such possibilities, but it is more
likely than transitioning directly to a political closure.
It is more likely because after transition initiation, as
we know, obligational legitimacy has broken down, weakening
the military's aversion to such a possibility. Even still,
it would take a revolution to accomplish a transformation
to totalitarianism.
3 . Foreign Policy Applications
As we begin to understand the inner workings of
transition from military rule in South America, numerous
opportunities for enlightened foreign policy application
present themselves. Knowing the sufficiency and necessity
of specific causal conditions is the first useful tool at
our disposal. As the logic causation section in Chapter 2
explained, control of a wanted effect consists of knowledge
of a sufficient condition. Therefore, to stimulate
transition from military rule, U.S. influence should
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concentrate on stimulating fractionalization of the
military (but not alienation from the U.S.) and reducing
the political capital available to the regime. As the
latter is almost impossible to do without looking like an
enemy to the entire population, and has questionable use
doing it halfway (as highlighted with the complex policy
toward South Africa) , we should expend the most energy on
the first. This can be accomplished in a non aggressive
way through more opportunities for foreign officers to
train and study in the U.S. and establishing more foreign
exchange billets for U.S. officers in Latin America,
exposing these officers to a different concept of the
military institution. Just as important as providing the
training billets, is the orientation of the potential
training. For example, it does little good (in the context
of this study) for foreign officers to attend the Inter-
American Defense College at the National Defense University
if they are cloistered away and do not have continual
interaction with the United States officers attending
National War College and the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces on the same campus. Also, foreign officers
attending more technically oriented schools in the United
States should have an opportunity to attend some of the
professional military education seminars or guest lectures.
In most instances foreign officers are automatically barred
from attending because of security concerns. Security
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should be an important concern, but selective prior
planning of topics, etc. , would remove this problem. These
officers would then be the seed of fractionalization in the
continued maintenance of obligational legitimacy. It was
also suggested in Chapter 2 that control of an unwanted
effect consists of knowledge of a necessary condition. In
other words, to support democratization in Latin America,
we need to concern ourselves with the necessary conditions
for reconstitution of obligational legitimacy (e.g. rigid
and impermeable organizational culture, "national security"
mission orientation, opportunity to establish hypothetical
obligation, etc.). The same program described above would
prove very useful. In addition, stimulation of an outward
security orientation (the reverse of our successful efforts
with Latin American militaries in the 1960s which stressed
internal security) through broader integration and
participation in military exercises and training. Of
course, the United States can also reduce the potential for
the creation of hypothetical obligation by aiding the
fledgling democracies through financial stability and
economic aid programs (not rigid austerity programs which
get short term debts paid, but create long term problems of
a higher caliber)
.
As suggested in the hypothesis and supported by
the case studies, international influence is only a contri-
buting variable in encouraging obligational legitimacy
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breakdown, but becomes much more important after transition
initiation has occurred. Also, as suggested by Hans
Binnendijk, timing of influence is critical. "Withdrawing
U.S. support too soon or maintaining it too long are
equally dangerous." 166 It is very important, therefore, to
know at what juncture the transition is in. In regard to
this study, U.S. foreign policy toward a ruler-type
military regime should not concentrate on transition, but
on stimulating obligational legitimacy breakdown. After
obligational legitimacy has broken down, the U.S. should
attempt to expedite the transition process. If the
transition process itself breaks down, care should be taken
to dilute the possibility of revolution (which not only
could destroy needed infrastructure and institutions that
any government would need in order to function, but this
presents the highest potential in Latin America for
establishment of a totalitarian regime) . In the past the
U.S. has successfully averted potentially debilitating
revolutions by removing the autocratic leader (e.g. Marcos
in the Philippines and Duval ier in Haiti) . This may prove
more difficult and not as successful with military ruler
regimes where the focal point of unrest is not as specific.
166 Hans Binnendijk, "Authoritarian Regimes in
Transition," The Washington Quarterly
. Spring 1987, p. 163.
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4 . Research Agenda
The strength of this study relies heavily on
deductive reasoning to establish the necessity and
sufficiency of the independent variables. One direction of
further research then is to continue inductive testing of
the variables as new transitions present themselves and as
new information becomes available on past transitions.
Along this same avenue of interest, the applicability of
this model to other parts of the world should be
investigated. The recent variety of transitions in
Thailand, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Turkey, and South Korea
offer a wide selection of research candidates.
Secondly, further investigation of the potential
reconstitution of obligational legitimacy in the militaries
of South America should be considered. This topic is
important because of the direct impact it might have on the
democracies in South America and on present U.S. foreign
policy. What have the ex ruler-type military organizations
reconstituted as? Is a new evolution to a new type of
military regime (as arbitrator regimes evolved into ruler
regimes) in progress now? Are new justifications for ruler
regimes evolving? Are ruler regimes the apex of military-
as-government and is the evolutionary process now leading
toward a new "low-class" (not motivated by economic class
issues, as were arbitrator regimes) , "low-state" (not
motivated by specific statist ideals, as were ruler
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regimes)? Are these militaries able to change their focus
of allegiance from the state to the democratic institution?
These are all questions that require attention, due to the
direct impact their answers will have on the future of
democracy in Latin America.
Finally, the regime transition matrix offered in
the Appendix, although useful, relies on subjective,
normative judgment. To assign accurate empirical weights
to the independent variables would greatly enhance the
descriptive value of the matrix. Applying empirical
methodology to this model will not reduce the weight of the
deductive and inductive logic, or the applicability of the
normative case study approach, but it would offer another
outlook from which to consider obligational legitimacy
breakdown and the transition process. Perhaps application
of empirical methodology could possibly lead to a value
defining the threshold at which obligational legitimacy













Influence 1 1 1 1
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34 32 48 34 4
Subjective Value Assignment RULE:
simultaneous overall value must be 15
points or higher for obligational
legitimacy breakdown and transition
intitiation
1 point for each contributing variable
5 points for each necessary variable
1 5 points for each sufficient variable
**Note: relative point spread between
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